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ARTICLES
IVY LEAGUE PRICE-FIXING: CONFLICT




"No one attending the [price-fixing] gatherings was so stupid
that he didn't know the meetings were in violation of the
law. But it is the only way a business can be run. It is free
enterprise."1
Price-fixing is universally acknowledged as the most pernicious
antitrust offense. 2 To Adam Smith price-fixing was evidence of a
* Edgar A. Hahn Professor of Jurisprudence, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, Cleveland, Ohio.
1 JOHN G. FULLER, THE GENTLEMEN CONSPIRATORS 191 (1962).
2 See A.D. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A 444 (3d ed., Cambridge
University Press 1980) (1960) (stating "Price-fixing agreements come first in importance
among these offenses and nobody in the United States now expects to get away with overt
price agreements or any of the obvious variants such as agreements for level tendering,
formula pricing, and so on").
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character flaw in tradesmen. 3 Attorney General Robert Kennedy
called it a "major threat to democracy." 4 Consistent with these
views the Supreme Court decrees some forms of price-fixing per
se illegal, beyond the redemption of any defenses. 5
The per se rule applies to "classic" price-fixing, i.e. cases in
which the conspirators are caught with their hands dangling in
the cookie jar.6 It is the tawdriness of the offense that accounts
for its public stigma. While the fix may be hatched on the
tailored greens of a posh golf course, Mafia-like tactics implement
the scheme. Communications via code or fraudulent travel
vouchers in which a trip to White Sulfur Springs ends in a
clandestine midnight meeting in Dirty Helens in Milwaukee:
"they were gentlemen, and they paid for their drinks,"7 while
erstwhile business colleagues devise ways to cheat on each other.
The sleaze factor tends to overshadow the economic subtleties
that motivate risking jail time. Fixing typically occurs in
concentrated markets where producers sell homogenous
products, e.g. oil, sugar, building supplies, confronted by inelastic
demand. 8 Homogeneity makes it easier to organize and conduct
the collusion.9 Moreover, the likelihood of tampering increases in
declining industries in which the profit level is being squeezed.10
It follows that in periods of shrinking demand managers are
3 See ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 137 (Prometheus Books 1991) (positing
meetings of members of same trade generally lead to conspiracies).
4 Fuller, supra note 1, at 176.
5 See, e.g., U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218-24 (1940) (emphasizing
that so-called competitive abuses or evils which price-fixing agreements were designed to
eliminate or alleviate do not justify a defense).
6 See id. at 223 (noting that classic price-fixing occurs under Sherman Act when a
combination is formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing,
pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce).
7 Fuller, supra note 1, at 174.
8 See David A. Butz, Vertical Price Controls With Uncertain Demand, 40 J. LAW &
ECON. 433, 455 (outlining the conventional ingredients for a successful cartel as
"homogeneous products, stable demand, concentrated retailing, entry barriers, long-run
profits.").
9 See Kenneth M. Davidson, Symposium, 1982 Merger Guidelines: The Competitive
Significance of Segmented Markets, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 445 (positing "homogeneity is a
condition that facilitates reaching consensus and detecting deviation" which makes price
fixing even more likely).
10 See Michael K. Vaska, Comment, Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining
the Boundary, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 508, 510 (1985) (discussing attraction of cartel formation
because cartels maximize profits of their members by reducing total output and setting
prices well above marginal cost, thus achieving a market price that is higher than the
price that would prevail if the market were competitive).
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pressured to improve performance and thus more likely to
succumb to price-fixing.1" However, there are anomalies.
a. The Ivy League Price-Fixers
But to many observers, there is one reason the case
against the Overlap agreement went forward. "Because,"
says a leading antitrust attorney, "they're a violation of the
antitrust laws."12
Ivy League price-fixing originated in a series of 1950 meetings
in which member schools reached a consensus not to bid for
"star" athletes and then turned to a discussion of whether a
similar consensus was appropriate for "star" students.13 M.I.T.
joined the Ivy Group14 as the meetings evolved into Overlap, a
yearly process for implementing a need-based admissions policy
by sharing student financial information.15 When tuition grants
among schools differed by more than $500, Overlap members
pledged to charge "approximately the same amount", regardless
of the school the student ultimately selected. 16 Any doubt about
Overlap's price-fixing intentions were resolved by the process
adopted at the annual meetings:
11 See id. at 511 (furthering that pressure to succeed can even drive members of cartel
to cheat on one another by pricing below the monopoly price).
12 Liza Mundy, Who Tdrgeted the Ivies? LINGUA FRANCA, Nov/Dec., 1992, at 30.
13 See Michael C. Petronio, Comment, Eliminating the Social Cost of Higher
Education: The Third Circuit Allows Social Welfare Benefits to Justify Horizontal
Restraints of Trade in United States v. Brown University, 83 GEO. L.J. 189, 200-01 (1994)
(explaining that Ivy Overlap Group developed whereby its member institutions met
annually to share financial information in order to adjust their figures for each admitted
candidate so that each family was asked to pay approximately the same amount
regardless of which Ivy Overlap institution the candidate chose, thus neutralizing the
effect of financial aid).
14 See id. at 189 n.2 (recanting details of Ivy Overlap Agreement, in which the
manual states that MIT is considered a member of Ivy Group for purposes of Ivy Overlap
rules).
15 See id. (outlining provisions of Ivy Overlap Agreement whereby all Ivy Group
institutions will share financial information concerning admitted candidates at annual
Ivy Overlap meeting prior to mid-April common notification date in order to enable
student to choose among the Ivy Group institutions for non-financial reasons).
16 U.S. v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1992) rev'd, remanded by U.S.
v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. Pa. 1993) (positing as a general rule that families will
be asked to pay approximately the same amount regardless of the Ivy Group institution
they choose to attend); see Douglas R. Richmond, Antitrust and Higher Education: An
Overview, 61 UMKC L. REV. 417, 451 (1993) (stating that family contributiondifferences
of less than $500 were understood to be close enough to warrant no discussion aimed at
determination of a common figure).
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During those few minutes allocated to individual aid
applicants, the schools could not and did not make a
genuine and concerted effort to assess accurately the aid
applicants actual financial circumstances... [the
meetings] were more a result of compromise and
expediency than a genuine effort, as M.I.T. contends, to
"get it right." As a result ... aid applicants and their
families would pay the same amount regardless of which
Ivy League Overlap Group Institution the student
decided to attend. 17
Overlap ignored ominous signals. Even a casual following of
the highly-charged news accounts of the Electrical Conspiracy of
the early 50's should have tripped in trepidation among Overlap
participants. One would expect those in authority to have sought
legal review after the publicity about executive jail sentences and
the Kefauver hearings that forced the public admission by the
General Electric CEO that his company's price fixing was
"foolish, immoral, and illegal."18
But this was not, at least initially, the stereotypical price-
fixing conspiracy. No slinking to Dirty Helens, no exotic codes,
no enforcers.19 "Nobody," said an Ivy spokesman, "is bound by
anything."20  It started with two groups - Overlap and
Pentagonal/Sisters21 - all elite private schools linked by a
common student audience, a shared educational ideology, as well
as an admissions perspective. Specifically, sharing student
information in order to implement a fair and efficient admissions
process. 22 As every antitrust lawyer knows, it is dangerous to
17 Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. at 295.
18 Fuller, supra note 1, at 202.
19 Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. at 294 (explaining, however, that they did appoint a
"driver" who was responsible for calling out applicant's name and schools which had
admitted applicant for Overlap comparisons).
20 Connie Leslie & Sue Hutchinson, An Ivy League Cartel, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1989,
at 65 (quoting Nancy Agnew, spokeswoman for Wellesley College).
21 Composed of: Amherst, Williams, Wesleyan, Bowdoin, Dartmouth, Barnard, Bryn
Mawr, Mount Holyoke, Radcliffe, Smith, Vassar, and Wellesley. The Pentagonal group
was comprised of formerly all-male schools. The Seven Sisters group consists of schools
which were historically all-female, though some schools in the group now admit male
students. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. at 290.
22 See id. at 293 (outlining an agreement between the Overlap members to "a common
system for measuring parental ability to pay and also seek to reduce differences in the
other elements of needs analysis").
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exchange information that touches prices or costs. 23 Hence the
irony of a comment by the president of an Overlap member who,
in extolling the socio-economic goals' of Overlap, bragged:
"Against such a plethora of information, college and university
officials seldom meet without there being some discussion about
tuition and salary."24
In a display of insouciance the president, "who once worked as
an antitrust lawyer,"25 overlooked the dangerous implications of
this comment and its historical origins with Adam Smith's
admonition:
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even
for merriment and diversion, but the conversation
ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some
contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to
prevent such meetings, by any law which either could
be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and
justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of
the same trade from sometimes assembling together,
it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies;
much less to render them necessary. 26
For over thirty years Overlap conducted a textbook price
cartel. 27  The coupling of the nation's most prestigious
institutions, all located within shouting - collusion - distance,
produced a snyergized form of market power. 28 The longevity of
the arrangement certifies its success in maintaining cartel
discipline. It was an achievement in the face of emerging - then
obvious - negative legal precedent shadowed by what eventually
became the reality of costly litigation.
23 See, e.g., U.S. v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 336-38 (1969) (emphasizing
that where the exchange of price information has an anticompetitive effect in an industry,
the Court will not allow price to be used even in an informal way to restrain competition).
24 William R. Cotter, Colleges' Efforts to Rationalize the Financial-Aid System Should
Not be Treated as Violations of Antitrust Laws, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 6, 1989, at
B1-3.
25 Id.
26 Smith, supra note 3, at 137.
27 Elbert L. Robertson, Antitrust as Anti-Civil Rights? Reflections on Judge
Higginbotham's Perspective on the "Strange" Case of United States v. Brown University, 20
YALE L. & POLy REV. 399, 401 (2002) (noting that Overlap began in the late 1950s).
28 Richard Morrison, Comment, Price Fixing Among Elite Colleges and Universities,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 807, 811 (1992) (arguing that "participants in the Overlap Group
probably possess a high degree of market power because the reputation commanded by
these schools carves out a distinct market for their educational services.").
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With Bleakhouse tenacity the Overlap issue has persevered
from the initial meetings in the 1950's on to the Congressional
exemption of today. In the interim, the Government
investigation and complaint came in the late 1980's followed by
the Ivy League members agreeing to a consent decree in 1991, as
M.I.T. opted to litigate to the Third Circuit, getting an adverse
decision in the District Court remanded in 1993.29 That same
year M.I.T. joined the consent decree. The Bleakhouse effect
continues with the extension of the exemption to 2008.30
This Essay examines the evolution of Overlap, including the
range of possible influences - history and context - capped by a
deconstruction of the Court of Appeal's effort to square the
academic mission with Antitrust principles. It is a narrative of
people with lofty ideals ultimately challenged by the conflicting
dynamics of an Intersection of Education and Commerce. The
discussion includes an explanation for Overlap's decision to
consent out despite a firm commitment to the credibility of their
legal position followed by an analysis of post decree expiration
consequences. The narrative ends with an effort to parse the
tensions between Antitrust and higher education. The essay
begins with a hypothetical Opinion Letter profiling the Antitrust
landscape during the early stages of Overlap.
b. The 1958 Opinion Letter
Consistent with Adam Smith's warning and the presence of an
ample number of supporting decisions, business associations do
not breathe without review by antitrust counsel. 31 As a preface it
should be noted that an Opinion Letter would offend the bulk of
the academic clients who would resent the suggestion of any
connection with the profit maximizing motivations of Trade.
29 Theodore J. Stachtiaris, Note, Antitrust In Need: Undergraduate Financial Aid and
United States v. Brown University, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745 (1994) (discussing 'Third
Circuit's decision to remand the case to the district court" and the ultimate settlement).
30 For a brief history of Overlap, see H.R. Rep. No. 107-32, at 2 (2001). The exemption
allows private universities to create agreements "to provide aid on the basis of need only,
to use common principles of need analysis, to use a common financial aid application
form, and to allow the exchange of the students' financial information through a third
party" until 2008. Michael F. Urbanski et al., Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, 38 U.
RICH. L. REV. 59, 83 (2003).
31 See PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT,
CASES § 242 (5th ed. 1997) (furthering that the decision to hold the meeting in itself could
be considered a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act).
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Even by 1989 - when there was no doubt about an antitrust
implication - the Overlap constituency was "stunned"32 by the
Antitrust Division's investigation, criticizing the Government for
conducting a "witch-hunt."33 Frustrated with the antitrust
entanglement, a Dartmouth official summed up the consensus:
"[s]chools like ours should not be seen as competitors in the same
way that toaster manufacturers are."34
Opinion letters would have covered common ground, 35 opening
with a blunt acknowledgement that but for the noncommercial
context the Overlap arrangement was classic price-fixing under
Socony Footnote 59;36 "surely one of the most important footnotes
in Supreme Court annals. ... 37 The conspiracy was
transparently advertised in the Manual of the Council of Ivy
League Presidents,38 an explicit codification of information
exchange procedures and pricing objectives: "The purpose of the
compare agreement is to neutralize the effect of financial aid so
that a student may choose among Ivy Group institutions for non-
financial reasons."39 Even the term Overlap was an open
32 See Gary Putka, Educated Moves: Elite Private Colleges Routinely Raising Tuition,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1989, at 1 (noting many educators, especially at private schools, were
stunned by the investigation).
33 Scott Jaschik, Investigation Into Tuition Fixing Spreads; 55 Institutions Now Say
They Are Targets, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., October 4, 1989, at Al (quoting Vanderbilt
University professor who stated that colleges have tried to "pretend this is not a real issue
by getting it depicted as a witch-hunt.").
34 Sharon LaFraniere, Ivy League Schools Agree To Halt Collaboration on Financial
Aid, WASH. POST., May 23, 1991, at A3 (quoting Dartmouth's argument that "colleges
should not be treated like ordinary businesses.").
35 An opinion letter would have included references to the danger of circulating any
information touching on price and cost.
When courts interpret an antitrust law to forbid horizontal agreements to set prices,
firms seeking to coordinate their behavior may experiment with "second best" devices
that fall short of reaching a consensus on output and prices but help approximate the
result of an express price-fixing arrangement. A number of Sherman Act decisions in
the 1920's dealt with agreements by competitors to engage in what commentators
later would call "facilitating practices." The era's most prevalent practice consisted of
agreements, often reached in the context of a trade association, to share information
on matters such as pricing, costs, inventories, and the terms of specific sales
transactions.
ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES CONCEPTS, AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY, 267 (2002).
36 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) (discussing
price-fixing standard under the Sherman Act).
37 James Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Fixing Rule - Preface and Perspective,
57 NW. U. L. REV. 137, 141 (1962) (noting importance of Justice Douglas's footnote in
Socony).
38 See United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 292-93 (1992) (noting various
policy and procedure provisions in the Manual).
39 Id. at 293.
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declaration of purpose - it specifically referred to the price
adjustments - fixing - of Overlapping student applications. 4 0
Economic power, the second prong of Footnote 59, was patent
in a conspiracy of the most elite and wealthy academic
institutions in the country - a virtual Prestige Cartel.41
According to economic theory, satisfaction of the third prong -
negative market effects - was inevitable. Competition for
students on the basis of merit was eliminated, sharing
application information produced cost savings unavailable to
nonmembers, and, most importantly, the application price
adjustments enabled Overlap members to maximize net revenue
from undergraduate education, which could be dispersed among
other institutional enterprises - including faculty and staff.4 2
Antitrust opinion letters adhere to a protocol of doom,
resurrection, and calculated hedging. Overlap would get a heavy
dose of doom under Footnote 59, which ironically came from
William 0. Douglas, a former law professor at Yale. 43 The
Sherman Act's restriction of jurisdiction to "restraints of trade or
commerce among the several states" 44 is resurrection of Justice
40 A disputed assumption, Hoxby attributes the term to the overlapping of the
athletic conferences - Ivy, Pentagonal, and Seven Sisters. Caroline M. Hoxby, Beneovlent
Colluders? The Effects of Antitrust Action on College Financial Aid and Tuition, NAT'L
BUREAU ECON.RES. WORKING PAPERS 7754 (June 2000). The Manual states that "[f]amily
contributions shall be compared and adjusted if necessary so that, as a general rule,
families will be asked to pay approximately the same amount regardless of the Ivy Group
institution they choose to attend." Brown, 805 F. Supp. at 293.
41 See GEORGE DENNIS O'BRIEN, ALL THE ESSENTIAL HALF-TRUTHS ABOUT HIGHER
EDUCATION, 144 (The University of Chicago Press 1998) (characterizing Overlap's price-
fixing scheme as a "[pirestige [c]artel"); David A. Garvin, THE ECONOMICS OF UNIVERSITY
BEHAVIOR, 10 (1980); see also Scott Maston, Old School Ties: Financial Aid Coordination
and the Governance of Higher Education, 28 J. ECO. BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION 23, 26-
9 (1995) (theorizing that non-price competition dissipates prestige power).
42 Donald Robert Carlson & George Bobrinskoy Shepherd, Cartel on Campus: The
Economics and Law of Academic Institutions' Financial Aid Price-Fixing, 71 OR. L. REV.
563, 579 (1992) (noting that "[i]n order to achieve the primary objective of prestige
maximization, institutions seek to maximize net revenues from undergraduate
education.").
43 Footnote 59's sweeping extension of Sherman Act coverage arguably confirms his
reputation for sloppiness. See Felicia R Lee, How Nobility of Purpose Can Square With
Meanness and Lies, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2003, at B1l. "In 'Wild Bill: The Legend and
Life of William 0. Douglas' (Random House), Bruce Allen Murphy, a professor of civil
rights at Lafayette College in Easton, Pa., argues that Douglas's sloppiness in framing
and writing Supreme Court decisions and his penchant for falsehood stemmed from
boredom with the high court and a deep need to invent the person he wanted to be: a
politician." Id.
44 Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of Trade, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 (2005)
(limiting the act's applicability to "restraint of trade, commerce among the several states,
or with foreign nations").
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Story's view of trade: "Wherever any occupation, employment, or
business is carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a
livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned professions, it
is constantly called a trade."45 Hence, when the Supreme Court
endorsed Story's definition of "trade" in 1950,46 the Opinion
Letter could persuasively counsel Overlap that a Sherman Act
threat was virtually non-existent. By plain meaning the Act's
express reference to "trade or commerce" excludes coverage of
Overlap's central mission of providing a liberal arts' education. 47
After noting the transparency of a conspiracy that provided the
member schools' with a predictable source of revenue, an Opinion
Letter would be obliged to approve Overlap. Prescient counsel
would add a modest hedge, calling attention to cases nibbling
away at the implicit learned profession exemption,48 the growing
relevance to antitrust of economic theory, and the emergence of a
close affinity between higher education and commerce,
concluding with a cautionary suggestion to get continued yearly
reviews. 49
c. The Intersection of Education and Commerce
World War II evoked the debut of a conflict between the
Emersonian view of "knowledge for the sake of knowledge"50 and
the commercial objectification of knowledge into a consumable
product. The G.I. Bill "sent a seismic shock through academic
life"51 by unleashing a large population of subsidized students
45 The Nymph, 18 Fed. Cas. 506, 507 (1834).
46 See United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1950)
(quoting Justice Story's definition of "trade" in Nymph and stating that "[iut is in that
broad sense that 'trade' is used in the Sherman Act").
47 Comment, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal and Other
"Noncommercial" Activities, 82 YALE L. J. 313, 316 (1972) (arguing that "[s]ince the Act
expressly applies to 'trade or commerce,' any activity not 'trade or commerce,' so the
inference goes, falls outside the Act").
48 See James E. Coleman, Jr., Learned Professions, Antitrust Exemptions, 33
ANTITRUST L.J. 48 (1967) (stating "there is no express statutory exemption for the
professions". It exists because of "a negative inference drawn from the affirmative
language of the Sherman Act, which extends federal antitrust jurisdiction only to 'trade or
commerce").
49 See Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Can Post-Chicago Economics Survive
Daubert?, 34 AKRON L. REV. 795, 807 (2001) (noting that "[t]he Chicago school of antitrust
economics is based on the insight that neoclassical economic theory is required to
understand market competition and, therefore, controls optimal antitrust enforcement").
50 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR 15, 23 (Cornell Press 1955).
51 CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY 52 (Harvard University Press 1963)
(noting G.I. Bill's effect on academic life); see Milton Greenbert, How the G.L Bill Changed
2006]
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that converted the Academy into a group of university nations,
each with increasing student and faculty populations. The
Federal government, at the urging of the influential Academy
lobby, opted to divest its wartime technological resources by
delegating future research to the university system, thereby
deploying a Marshall Plan for U.S. colleges. 52 Under the aegis of
the National Science Foundation, the federal government used
the grant system to transfer wealth to the Academy for problem-
solving projects thereby converting research into a form of
entrepreneurial capitalism while institutionalizing an
intersection of Education and Commerce.5 3
In a 1963 Harvard lecture, Clark Kerr acknowledged that the
Intersection was causing a "vast transformation of university
life"54 creating "The Federal Grant University". Three years
later Life Magazine provided a glimpse into the transformation
by publishing The Wizard of Flunk-Out U.55 Willard G. Roberts,
Ph.D. and President of Parsons College, defied the Emersonian
ideal by anticipating the Wal-Mart tactics of contemporary
academe: he openly used money to attract faculty, aggressively
bragged about making a profit, while recruiting flunk-outs and
students with poor credentials. 56 Roberts' flamboyant style,
defiance of conventional academic protocol, seeming success
(Parsons went from 300 to over 5,000 students during his tenure
Higher Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 18, 2004, at B9 (discussing the impact
that G.I. Bill had on universities).
52 See M. Gregg Bloche, Review Essay, Rogue Science: Science in the Service of
Human Rights. By Richard Pierre Claude, 91 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1259 (2003) (noting that in
Cold War America, 'leading universities affirmed their commitment to conducting science
in service of the nation's security, though they insisted on maintaining Chinese walls
between classified military research and academic programs").
53 Haran Craig Rashes, The Impact of Telecommunication Competition and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 on Internet Service Providers, 16 TEMP. ENVrL. L. &
TECH. J. 49, 52-3 (1997) (detailing National Science Foundation's involvement in
development of the internet, its initial purpose for "non-commercial use by research and
educational organizations" and subsequent privatization).
54 Kerr, supra note 51.
55 James D. Koerner, THE PARSONS COLLEGE BUBBLE 166 (Basic Books, Inc. 1970).
("It was the work of members of Life's Chicago staff and had been done with the
encouragement of a Milwaukee public relations firm that Roberts was then retaining.
Both Roberts and his publicists expected treatment that would be favorable in the
customary way. The article, enriched with large photographs and plentiful quotes from
Parson's students, turned out to be a racy, satirical, and blistering account of Robert's
'rip-roaring, bell-ringing, every-time-a bulls-eye salesmanship and rigid cost accounting.'
The main focus of the piece was on the country-club aspect of the college, the draft-
dodging 'dumb rich kids,' the sports cars, the hard-drinking party-goers, and the fat profit
that Parsons said it was making out of it all.").
56 Id. at 58-62.
[Vol. 2 1: 1
IVYLEA GUE PRICE-FJNG
1955-67), and bad publicity, led to the decertification and
eventual demise of Parsons College. 57
University accrediting agencies are voluntary associations
constituting a "somewhat formal structure to effectuate common
purposes and goals."58 They function as a barrier to entry:
without accreditation a school's students cannot transfer, its
graduates are hindered in graduate school admission, and, most
importantly, both student and institution are denied various
forms of governmental assistance.59 For Parsons College the real
barrier was the prevailing Emersonian vision that did not
countenance interference in the accepted methods of transferring
knowledge. They were accused of abdicating acceptable
admission standards in exchange for tuition, mocking
Emersonian ideals with Wal-Mart promotions, and the
"persistent failure on the part of the College to correct certain
serious weaknesses in its operation."60 Judge Julius Hoffman
implicitly endorsed the Emersonian culture by rejecting Parsons
due process claim with pointed advice: "In this case, the issue
was not innocence but excellence."61
In the prevailing idiom of mass marketing Roberts
commercialized the college degree by treating students as
consumers, convincing them that a degree is an entitlement. 62 It
57 See Betsie Freeman, Cultivating Harmony Transcendental Meditators and Other
Residents Learn to Live Together in an Iowa Town, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, October 10,
2004, at 1E (reporting that Parsons College property was bought for 3 million dollars in
1974 by Maharishi University of Management, founded by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, who
was also the founder of the Transcendental Movement).
58 Comment, The Legal Status of the Educational Accrediting Agency: Problems in
Judicial Supervision and Governmental Regulation, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 104, 108 (1966).
59 See Hazel G. Beh, Downsizing Higher Education and Derailing Student
Educational Objectives: When Should Student Claims for Program Closures Succeed?, 33
GA. L. REV. 155, 172-173 (1998) for examples of how certain accrediting agencies aid
students in the event an academic program is terminated. 'When a program is forced to
close, many accrediting agencies have promulgated standards that require the closing
program to develop a closure plan that facilitates orderly closure and minimizes
disruption of student education." Id. at 172. Such care is necessary, as almost all
professions require graduation from an accredited program as prerequisite to practice. See
id. at 172, n.70. "In those cases, loss of accreditation is devastating to the school and the
student." Id.
60 Parsons College v. North Central Assoc. of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 271 F.
Supp. 65, 68 (1967).
61 Id. at 72.
62 See Vance Packard, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 123 (David McKay Company, Inc.
1957) (quoting Lloyd Warner, an influential American sociologist and anthropologist who
was noted for his studies on class structure for the proposition that "Within the status
systems something else operates that is at the very center of American life and is the
most motivating force in the lives of many of us - namely what we call social mobility, the
2006]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
was a campaign that "needed to be done with some deftness as no
one cares to admit he is a social striver."63 Roberts succeeded
with the students but failed to impress his peers - and the
press. 64 His timing was bad; the academy still esteemed
"excellence," meritocracy, and the Emersonian paradigm. Had
Roberts packaged his open admissions program as a class
distinction metaphor, or "a second opportunity for
underachievers", it would have helped, but not changed, the
outcome.
Although the Emersonian model still dominated, Overlap
would have been less confident of their invulnerability to
antitrust scrutiny if they had only parsed the implications of
Clark Kerr's Harvard lecture. Speaking of the transformation of
the university to a captive of the federal grant apparatus, he
noted the shift from the traditional knowledge for its own sake
ideals to a corporate model:
The university and segments of industry are becoming
more alike. As the university becomes tied into the
world of work, the professor - at least in the natural
and some of the social sciences - takes on the
characteristics of an entrepreneur. Industry, with its
scientists and technicians, learns an uncomfortable bit
about academic freedom and the handling of
intellectual personnel. The two worlds are merging
physically and psychologically. 65
Cautioning his audience on the need to adjust to the
transformation, Kerr warned of the habit of faculty to be "liberal
about the affairs of others" but "radically conservative" within
the context of their own backyard. 66
aspiration drive, the achievement drive, the movement of an individual and his family
from one level to another, the translation of economic goods into socially approved
symbols, so that people achieve higher status.").
63 Id.
64 See Parsons College, 271 F. Supp. at 68 (discussing how the Commission on
Colleges and Universities unanimously voted to drop Parsons College from its
membership primarily due to "lack of confidence in the administrative leadership of the
College.").
65 Kerr, supra note 51, at 90-91.
66 Id. at 99.
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d. Overlap Gets Some Space
In a terse series of paragraphs - less than a page of text
(excluding footnotes)67 - the D.C. Circuit Court cited lack of
Sherman Act jurisdiction in reversing the District Court's
holding that an accreditation association's refusal to evaluate
Marjorie Webster Junior College's application for membership
was an unreasonable restraint of trade. 68 Although the specific
explanation was the plaintiffs failure to implicate "trade or
commerce," the broader context was the Intersection of
Education and Commerce. 69 As a proprietary school Webster
could not satisfy the rule that a member "should be a non-profit
organization with a governing board representing the public
interest."70 Profit and its baggage was the flash point of the trial,
buzzing with clashing testimony over the compatibility between
profit and the Emersonian ideal.71
Witnesses for Middle States argued that education is an
"eleemosynary activity" and "not under any circumstances... to
67 Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Assoc. of Colleges and
Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 653-55 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that (1) Sherman
Act was not applicable to Middle States' conduct, (2) circumstances did not warrant
judicial interference with accreditation and membership policies of Middle States, and (3)
assuming applicability of Due Process Clause, Marjorie Webster did not sustain burden of
showing irrationality of policy in question as applied to bar consideration of Marjorie
Webster for accreditation).
68 Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Assoc. of Colleges and
Secondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969). Marjorie Webster Junior College,
Inc. had sought regional accreditation for its District of Columbia institution, and the
District Court had invoked jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C. §1337, which vests original
jurisdiction of actions involving the antitrust laws in the district courts of the United
States, and D.C. Code § 11-521 (1967 ed.). Id. at 460.
69 For an interesting discussion on this point, see Clark C. Havighurst & Nancy M.P.
King, Private Credentialing of Health Care Personnel: An Antitrust Perspective, 9 AM. J.L.
& MED. 131 (1983). The authors note that Justice Bazelon's opinion in Marjorie Webster
was "particularly insightful in suggesting the possibility that proprietary schools might
organize a competing accrediting body, thus facilitating competition between differing
philosophies of education." Id. at 164-65. Yet, in the end, they opine that "issues of this
kind should be resolved in the marketplace and not in the courts .... Id. at 165.
70 Marjorie Webster, 302 F. Supp. at 462.
71 For further discussion of Emersonian philosophy and its compatibility with current
social theory, see Cornel West, Symposium, Roberto Unger's Politics: A Work in
Constructive Social Theory: Between Dewey and Gramsci: Unger's Emancipatory
Experimentalism, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 941 (1987). The symposium presents an in-depth
examination of Emersonian themes, such as "the centrality of a self's morally laden
transformative vocation; the experimentation of the self to achieve self-mastery and
kinship with nature; and.. the idea of self-creation and self-authorization." Id. at 943.
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be confused or equated with a profit-making institution."72 The
responsibility of higher education is to "overcome the ignorance
of students," a goal incompatible with the profit motive. 73
Moreover, in a proprietary school there would be a "divided
allegiance by those responsible for the basic decisions between
making a profit and the quality of the program." 74
Marjorie Webster witnesses extolled the benefits of the profit
motivated efficient use of resources, 75 amplified by testimony
arguing that the "profit motive might be one mechanism by
which new private institutions.. . could ... offer competition to
the state systems. ... "76 Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman, the
plaintiffs star witness, testified:
One of the desirable features about a profit institution
is that it makes the interests of the man who runs it
tend to coincide with the interests of his customers
and whether these customers be students who come to
college to learn or whether they be other
customers .... One of the sources of the current
unrest on the campuses is undoubtedly the fact that
as more and more of the financing is available from
research funds, from governmental funds, there has
been less and less need for these institutions to serve
their customers properly, namely, the students .... 77
The District Court decision "sent shock waves through the
world of professional higher education."78 Milton Friedman's
apparent influence exacerbated the Academy's disappointment
and bafflement. He had become a symbol of the free market
72 James Thomas Bannon, Jr., The Regional Accrediting Associations and the Courts:
A Study of the Marjorie Webster Case (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse
University) (on file with University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan) at 100.
73 Id. at 101 (quoting testimony of John Everett, President of the New School for
Social Research).
74 Id. (quoting testimony of Glenn J. Christensen, President of Middle States).
75 Id. at 103 (discussing statement of Lloyd Elliott, President of George Washington
University).
76 Id. at 105.
77 Id. at 103-4. Bannon sums up: "What all of the expert testimony on the profit
motive in higher education seemed to come down to was: (1) that expert witnesses for the
Association shunned the idea of proprietary education without knowing anything about it
and (2) that expert witnesses for the College, while not on completely firm ground, at least
presented some plausible arguments which tended to refute the assertions of the
Association's witnesses. When opinion freely abounds, there is much to be said for the
plausible argument." Id. at 105-6.
78 Id. at 8.
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movement that exulted supply and demand driven by profit - a
concept anathema to the contemporary academic
establishment. 79
The president of Middle States described the seriousness of the
threat:
Now, in 1969, a United States District Court has ruled
that education is a form of commerce. This, in effect,
moves education from the enclave of tradition,
wherein it has grown and flourished for twenty-four
centuries, and forces it into the world of commerce,
subject to all the restrictions and restraints
indigenous to the market place. In effect, it dictates
that education is a product, not a process; that a
college is a property, not a community; and that a
teacher is an employee, not an agent of his
civilization. 80
Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
premise that education is a "form of commerce" and his opinion
should have inspired a favorable Opinion Letter to Overlap
clients subject, however, to some caveats. It was a dismissive -
even curt - opinion. Confronted with an issue of considerable
importance, Bazelon uncharacteristically passed without a
thorough analysis. Several years later, a Yale Law Journal
Comment offered a plausible explanation for the Judge's
strategy.S1
Judge Bazelon recognized two limitations on Sherman Act
jurisdiction - first, activity not Trade or Commerce and secondly,
"traditionally noncommercial" activities.8 2  The Comment
challenged the applicability of the first as a jurisdictional
79 For further discussion of how economic, consumer-driven theory can be applied to
academic institutions, see Marina Lao, Discrediting Accreditation?: Antitrust and Legal
Education, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1035, 1078-87 (2001). The article, in general, accords with
Milton Friedman's position that "fears about consumers' inability to make choices for
themselves are paternalistic and unsound, and that excluding competitors only serves to
enhance a profession's income and status." Id. at 1081 n.266.
80 James D. Koerner, The Case of Marjorie Webster, 20 THE PUB. INTEREST 40, 54-55
(Summer, 1970).
81 Comment, supra note 47 (analyzing the recent Supreme Court decisions regarding
the Sherman Act from a more practical perspective).
82 Id. at 317-18; see Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States
Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F. 2d 650, 653 (D.C. Circuit 1970)
("Despite the broad wording of the Sherman Act, it has long been settled that not every
form of combination or conspiracy that restrains trade falls within its ambit.").
2006]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:1
requirement due to its origin as "a convenient drafting device" to
assure that the common law restraint of trade characterization
would not exceed the constitutional limits of the Commerce
Clause.8 3 The second limitation had been "created"8 4 specifically
by Judge Bazelon to get around the fact that Marjorie Webster
was a proprietary institution and hence was, in fact, trade or
commerce.8 5 Relying on generalizations,8 6 Bazelon concluded
that the process of college accreditation was not a "traditional"
commercial activity. Dismissing the two limitations as ad hoc
bootstraps the Comment concludes that the Supreme Court "has
consistently considered the evil [of restraints of trade] in general
economic terms."87
Marjorie Webster gave Overlap at least five years of space
before the 1975 Goldfarb decision extended antitrust jurisdiction
dangerously close to, if not within, the non-profit sector. 88
Someone associated with Overlap surely read the Goldfarb
decision in which a unanimous court held that "the public service
aspect" of the practice of law "does not provide sanctuary from
83 Comment, supra note 47, at 321 (theorizing the legislature meant to exempt
"learned professions" such as law and medicine).
84 Id. at 317 (furthering that this limitation also rests on the "assumption that
Congress did not intend the Act to apply universally").
85 Marjorie Webster forced the issue by refusing to switch to non-profit status. "It
might have yielded to Middle States' suggestions and converted to nonprofit status. It
would then have been accredited by Middle States in all probability and would have
solved its most pressing problems. But conversion would have brought heavy taxes to the
stockholders. It would also have represented to the Webster family a surrender to
discriminatory practice and monopolistic power in education. To one member of the
family, Sherwood Webster, such a surrender was particularly galling. He is one of two
vice-presidents of the college and he more than any other person wanted to fight Middle
States rather than capitulate to it in the way that other proprietary institutions had done
in the past." Koerner, supra note 80, at 44.
86 See, e.g. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 214 n.7 (1959)
("The Court in Apex recognized that the Act is aimed primarily at combinations having
commercial objectives and is applied only to a very limited extent to organizations, like
labor unions, which normally have other objectives"); Marjorie Webster Junior College,
Inc; 432 F.2d at 654 ("But the proscriptions of the Sherman Act were 'tailored... for the
business world,' not for the noncommercial aspects of the liberal arts and the learned
profession.").
87 Comment, supra note 47, at 326. "The Act maintains a free market by barring
interference from accreditation and exercise of market power on the theory that an open
market system will elicit products and services at the lowest prices. At the same time, it
assures those who produce goods or provide services of an open market in which to freely
compete." Id.
88 See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Private Colleges and Tuition Price-Fixing: An
Antitrust Primer, 17 J.C. & U.L. 271, 276 (1991) (noting that "[iut is now beyond question.
• . that nonprofit status, standing alone, is insufficient to shield organizations from
antitrust scrutiny.").
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the Sherman Act."8 9 The litmus test is whether there is an
exchange of money for services, 90 a proposition that was
subsequently endorsed by both courts in the Overlap litigation.
I. CONTEXT
Yet setting things in context is always worth doing,
always illuminating. It helps us enlarge the picture.
It peers behind the masks that writers and theorists
take up to convince us that they have given birth to
themselves. There are always risks involved in
searching out the figure in a carpet or shaping the
multitude of possibilities into a single coherent
narrative. 91
a. Vietnam and Social Consciousness
The timeline for Overlap's context is symbolized by a 1966
conversation between the Yale Corporation and the newly
appointed admission director who, with the endorsement of
President Kingman Brewster, announced that henceforth
students would be admitted on the basis of talent, merit, and
diversity.92 The Corporation was told that the traditional
automatic pipeline from the favored prep schools was history.
While never referencing Overlap in his certification of THE
GUARDIANS, Geoffrey Kabaservice nevertheless describes its
echo:
The policy received relatively little attention at the
time and its financial implications were seriously
underestimated, but need-blind admissions became
one of the most important ways in which Yale
89 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
90 Id. (explaining that this is the requirement for activity to be considered commerce).
91 Morris Dickstein, Literary Theory and Historical Understanding, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), May 23, 2003, at B7, B10.
92 GEOFFREY KABASERVICE, THE GUARDIANS: KINGMAN BREWSTER, HIS CIRCLE, AND
THE RISE OF THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT, Chp. 7 (2004). "When told that the new
students would come from nontraditional sources - public high school graduates, Jews,
minorities, and even women, his interlocular shot back; You're talking about Jews and
public school graduates as leaders. Look around you at this table' - he waved a hand at
Brewster, Lindsay, Moore, Bill Bundy, and the other distinguished men assembled there.
'These are America's leaders. There are no Jews here. There are no public school
graduates here'." Id. at 259.
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attracted students from less affluent backgrounds.
Brewster observed that the policy helped attract
wealthy students as well, particularly during the
1960s. Now that "the pocketbook was no longer
relevant to admission," he said, "the privileged took
pride in the feeling that [they] had made it on the
merits rather than on the basis of something
ambiguously called 'background."' 93
Yale's need-based admissions policy was a high risk departure
from tradition, inviting - and getting - vigorous criticism from
alumni and often vicious hostility from feeder prep schools. 94 As
an "evolutionary path between revolution and decay" 95 it was
rationalized by its advocates as a metaphor for social
consciousness, an objective that was soon appropriated and
dominated by the Vietnam War.
The Vietnam Context was a student rebellion against the draft
that escalated into violent confrontation with what was viewed
as an authoritarian, white male, hierarchical academy covering
for an unjust war.96 Violence was de rigueur at places like
Harvard, Berkeley, Columbia, Cornell, Brown, Chicago,
Wisconsin, Duke, and Stanford, which became battlegrounds for
strikes and occupation, and ultimately death at Jackson State
and Kent State. 97 As the university system bartered with
concessions the movement enlarged its agenda to include student
participation in decision-making, revised curriculum, and a more
diverse student body.
93 Id. at 264.
94 See e.g. Nicholas Thompson, The Best, The Top, The Most, N.Y. TIMES, August 3,
2003, at 4A, Column 3, Education Life Supplement, Pg. 24 (reporting generally that
schools feel pressure to stay on top of U.S. News and World report and thus have a
tendency to grant merit scholarships rather than need-based ones).
95 See Kabaservice, supra note 92, at 289.
96 See generally Todd Edward Pettys, Punishing Offensive Conduct on University
Campuses: Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University, 72
N.C.L.REV. 789, 795 n.50 (mentioning numerous Vietnam rebellions on college campuses).
97 In a vignette of the times Kathy Boudin, a student in my first.year Contracts
course in 1968 withdrew to join the Weatherman. Kathy served twenty-two years for
participating in a robbery of a Brink's truck and the killing of two police officers. For a
description of the incident, Boudin's subsequent sentencing and incarceration, see Susan
Braudy, FAMILY CIRCLE: THE BOUDINS AND THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LEFT (2003);
Elizabeth Kolbert, The Prisoner: Kathy Boudin's Dreams of Revolution Got Her Twenty
Years Behind Bars, Should She Now Go Free? NEW YORKER, July 16, 2001, p.4 4 . In 1970,
twenty miles south of my school, the National Guard killed four Kent State students. See
Gerald W. Heaney, Judge Martin Donald Van Oosterhout: The Big Judge from Orange
City, Iowa, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1, 32 (1993).
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Social consciousness was the unifying mantra of the student
antiwar movement. Draft deferment, which discriminated
against the poor and minorities, was a high-impact and clearly
legitimate target.98 For the Ivy schools, it was a particularly
sensitive issue; they were, by their own acknowledgement, the
traditional sanctuary of the Nation's best and brightest - which,
under the glare of protesters, came to mean white male elitist
Wasp preppies. It became a symbiotic conflict in which Overlap's
social consciousness theme was validated by the antiwar
movement, compelling its continued existence.
In the chaos of the Vietnam crisis serious consideration of the
antitrust risks of a politically significant practice was highly
unlikely. Overlap's first - and only - priority was to manage and
monitor a paradigm change from the old authoritarian, white
male, hierarchical, research intense system to a more inclusive
egalitarian model. 99 Charles Reich, a young Yale Law professor,
captured the evolving motif in the discovery of the Lost Selfs
redemption in skepticism "of both linear and analytic
thought."l0 0 Reich's vision was "suspicious of logic, rationality,
analysis, and of principles."101 Adjusting to grading
egalitarianism to keep students out of military service, 102 forced
to share decision-making with students, and being held
accountable in student evaluations, rendered the risk of an
antitrust attack on a project in sync with the prevailing context
an acceptable trade-off.
98 See Jules Witcover, Still Looking for Successor to RFK, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland,
Ohio), at 2C (reporting on Kennedy's chiding of students who would accept draft
deferments while protesting in favor of the poor and minorities who generally ended up
going to war for them).
99 See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 664 (3d Cir. 1993) (rationalizing the
existence of the Overlap Group, MIT argued that it "increased consumer choice and
enhanced the quality of the education provided to all students by opening the doors of the
most elite colleges in the nation to diversely gifted students of varied socio-economic
backgrounds").
100 Charles A. Reich, THE GREENING OF AMERICA 241 (1970).
101 Id. at 278.
102 The appropriateness of grading curves continues to divide the academy. See John
Marrow, Easy Grading Makes Deep Learning More Important, USA TODAY, Feb. 5, 2003,
at 13A; Stuart Rojstaczer, Everyone is Above Average, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2003, at A21;
Valen E. Johnson, An A is an A is an A, N.Y. TIMES, EDUCATION LIFE, §4(A), April 14,
2002, at 14. A Harvard law professor resolved the controversy by giving 149 A's and one
B+ in his evidence course. Katrina Campbell, With Nesson, An A for Evidence, HARVARD
RECORD, Mar. 18, 1994, at 1.
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b. The Postmodern Backlash
Louis Menand introduces his account of the backlash against
the 1945-75 Golden Age of Education with the emergence of a
new faculty-student profile: less white males, more minorities
and females - accompanied by a drop in enrollment.O 3 The
response came in a competitive recruitment environment in
which schools targeted a new relevant market of non-whites and
women. 104 According to Menand, "it was economic necessity that
made them do it."105
In the emerging "backlash" anti-disciplinary scholarship -
work that "amounted to criticism of the practices and
assumptions of its own discipline"O6  - transformed the
Academy's agenda.107 Menand exults the destruction of the walls
separating disciplines, a recognition that "cultural differences
seem a lot more interesting than similarities."1OS The
transformation from the Golden Age template of objectivity,
reason, and knowledge was certified by Bakke, which forced the
Academy to "begin talking about diversity. .. "109 'Diversity' is
the very word Powell used in the Bakke opinion, and there are
probably very few college catalogs in the country in which the
word 'diversity,' or one of its cognates, does not appear.'11o
Menand's "backlash" interpretation is confirmed by the
ideological influence from the influx of '60's legacies into the
103 Louis Menand, College: The End of the Golden Age, THE N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS,
October 18, 2001, at 47.
104 Id. at 45. "[T]he system had over expanded during the Golden Age. Too many
state-subsidized slots had been created, and one result was a much higher level of
competition among colleges to recruit students." Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 'There is no doubt that this work, by feminists, students of colonialism and post-
colonialism, non-whites, gays, and so on, tended to call into question the very idea of
academic disciplines as discrete and effectively autonomous fields of inquiry. But the
questioning of the traditional assumptions of academic work, particularly in the social
sciences and humanities, that took place after 1975 was only adding fuel to a fire started
from other causes." Id.
108 Id. at 46.
109 Id.
110 The dialogue concentrated on "... talk about 'interpretations' (rather than 'facts'),
'perspective' (rather than 'objectivity'), and 'understanding' (rather than 'reason' or
,analysis'). An emphasis on universalism and 'greatness' has been replaced by an
emphasis on diversity and difference; the scientistic norms which once prevailed in many
of the 'soft' disciplines are viewed with skepticism; 'context' and 'contingency' are
continually emphasized; attention to 'objects' has given away to attention to
,representations."' Id. at 46-7.
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Academy who rode Vietnam deferment into graduate school and
on to tenure making yesterday's student radical today's tenured
professor or academic dean."' Radical Harvard Law professor
Duncan Kennedy, who advocated a lottery admissions policy for
elite law schools,112 explained the 60's legacy: "The slogan should
not be '68, the failed revolutionary movement ... but the 60's, a
diffuse cultural rebellion with a thousand specific implications
for daily life in the 90's."113 A coalition of tenured radical faculty
supported by energized students carried the 60's diversity culture
into a 90's validation of Overlap.
II. AN ANTITRUST DECONSTRUCTION LOOKING FOR SOCIAL
WELFARE
A renovated faculty/student population combined to produce
new intellectual currents derived from the dissolution of
disciplinary parameters and motivated by a dedication to
theoretical proof of the arbitrariness of meaning. The controlling
theory is deconstruction, which offers a process for the deferral of
meaning through tracing1 4 - each word or phrase has a legacy
111 ROGER KIMBALL, TENURED RADICALS: HOW POLITICS HAS CORRUPTED OUR
HIGHER EDUCATION xiv (Elephant Paperback 1998) (1990) (noting that the new academic
elite are the tenured or soon-to-be-tenured radicals now controlling nearly all of the most
prestigious humanities departments in the country); see DINESH D'SouzA, ILLIBERAL
EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS 1-23 (1991); CHARLES SYKES, THE
HOLLOW MEN: POLITICS AND CORRUPTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Regnery Gateway 1990)
(discussing the crisis in higher education and focusing on its impact upon Dartmouth
College); see also Michael W. Hirschorn, A New-Left Challenger Comes to an Uneasy Peace
with Academe, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 29, 1988, at A3 (describing the movement of
60s student-activists into teaching positions).
112 DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY
121-22 (1983). Of Kennedy, Calvin Trillin said: "Kennedy - who can turn out slightly
antic left-wing slogans practically as a parlor trick, the way some people can recite the
verses to old songs - has said, 'Resist at the bourgeois dinner party as well as on the
assembly line."' Calvin Trillin, A Reporter at Large: Harvard Law, NEW YORKER, Mar. 26,
1984, at 53, 59.
113 Ken Emerson, When Legal Titans Clash, N.Y.TIMES MAG., April 22, 1990, at 26,
66.
114 Trace refers to the suspension of meaning: every word has trace of meaning from
previous words while simultaneously hold itself open to the traces of subsequent words.
See TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 114, 119 (University of
Minnesota Press 1996) (1983). Trace joins the "inside" of the text to the outside.
According to EVE TAVOR BANNET, STRUCTURALISM AND THE LOGIC OF DISSENT 212
(University of Illinois Press 1989): "It joins the word or meaning which is 'present' in the
text to words, meanings and associations which are 'absent' in the text but implied by the
word's chain of associations or differential relations. Of course, the precondition for this
operation is to erase such concepts as authorial intention, linguistic intentionality and the
difference between conscious and unconscious intentions. Cleverly used, a word in one
literary or philosophical text can lead not only to any number of other literary or other
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from its previous use, while simultaneously remaining open for a
new- deferred- meaning. 115
Despite intended obfuscatory syntax,116 deconstruction is a
relatively simple process. Start the performance by identifying a
"privileged" interpretation of the text as decreed by the
"dominant" majority view. An authoritative, privileged
interpretation rationalizes the process of deconstruction.117 The
next step: identify a counter - repressed118 - interpretation and
nominate it as the new privileged meaning.119 The performance
never stops; the new privileged meaning is now subjected to the
same "undermining, subverting, exposing, undoing,
transgressing, and demystifying"120 treatment. What remains is
discord: "the text resolutely refusing to offer any privileged
reading ..."121
From the 1970's deconstruction was the fashion for the
humanities and social sciences, engaging students and faculty in
sophisticated theoretical exercises in interpretation.122  The
fashion was funneled into legal education through the efforts of
three anti-establishment movements - Critical Legal Studies,
Feminists, and Critical Race - who esteemed deconstruction for
philosophical texts, but almost anywhere, in a system of 'infinite reference of one to
another."'
115 For discussions of deconstruction, see JOHN ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION
(1989); DAVID LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIMES (1991); FRANK LENTRICCHIA, AFTER THE NEW
CRITICISM (1980); Raymond Tallis, A Cure for Theorrhea, 3 CRITICAL REV. 7 (1989).
116 A duty to "avoid transparent language." Tallis, supra note 115, at 29.
117 "To say that a text has one meaning sounds inherently restrictive; that makes the
leap to 'no limit on meanings' - the typical leap to an opposite extreme - more plausible."
Ellis, supra note 115, at 125.
118 "A repressed writing.., is the 'tension between gesture and statement' in such
critical texts which 'liberates the fixture of a general grammatology."' CHRISTOPHER
NORRIS, DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 31 (Methuen & Co. 1982).
119 While always retaining the "privileged" view-in view "Deconstruction does and
must then require that the traditional idea be held still and allow itself to be
deconstructed and retained; and the whole resulting complex is the result of the
deconstructive method. Since deconstruction wants to show that the text says the
opposite (or also says the opposite) of what it seems to say or is traditionally thought to
say, the traditional version is the reference point that deconstruction needs both during
and after it has done its work in order to exist." Ellis, supra note 116, at 71.
120 Id. at 69 (listing the words used to describe the operation that deconstruction
performs).
121 Id. at 71 (explaining what deconstruction shows and that deconstructive criticism
clearly transgresses the limits established by traditional criticism).
122 "[T]he product of a restless play within language that cannot be fixed or pinned
down for the purposes of conceptual definition." See CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, DERRIDA 15
(Harvard University Press 1987) (citing the example of how Derrida coined the neologism
diffirance in order to suggest how meaning is at once 'differential' and 'deferred').
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its practical use as a vehicle to subvert what was viewed as a
dominant law culture of politicized objectivity and patriarchy.123
"Law is conceived to be the instrument of ideology, the ideology of
ruling class, and it is the legal scholars' duty to demystify it,
exposing rhetoric as sham and putative truths as spurious."'124
Hence upon matriculation students were embraced by a result-
oriented group of faculty bent on using deconstruction to impose
social consciousness on the law.125
Everything in the curriculum - beginning with the core of
contracts, torts, and constitutional law - received a
deconstruction screening, 126 except antitrust. To the antitrust
cognoscente the reason is obvious: the Sherman Act's puzzling
language along with its historical underpinnings propagate and
perpetuate a persistent stream of privilege - marginalized
confrontations.127 Speaking in a Derridaian stutter, antitrust
judges have devised an esoteric vocabulary to issue irreconcilable
opinions constituting an open invitation to criticism and
deconstruction.128 Everyone reforms antitrust; muckrakers from
Ida Tarbell to Ralph Nader come and go, Robber Barons, from J.
P. Morgan ("I like a little competition, but I like combination
123 See Gerald P. Moran, A Radical Theory of Jurisprudence: The "Decisionmaker" as
the Source of Law, 30 AKRON L. REV. 393, 414-21 (1997) (explaining the currently
developing trends in law schools and their being confronted with the underlying themes of
postmodernism in an effort to explain the acts of the "Decisionmaker."); see also Barbara
Johnson, Response: The Postmodern in Feminism, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1076 (1992)
(discussing the use of postmodern theory with feminist theory).
124 DAVID LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIMES: DECONSTRUCTION AND THE FALL OF PAUL DE
MAN 38 (1991).
125 See ROGER KIMBALL, TENURED RADICALS: How POLITICS HAS CORRUPTED OUR
HIGHER EDUCATION xiv (Elephant Paperback 1998) (1990) (noting that the new academic
elite are the tenured or soon-to-be-tenured radicals now controlling nearly all of the most
prestigious humanities departments in the country); DINESH D'SOuZA, ILLIBERAL
EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS 1-23 (1991); CHARLES SYKES, THE
HOLLOW MEN: POLITICS AND CORRUPTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Regnery Gateway 1990)
(discussing the crisis in higher education and focusing on its impact upon Dartmouth
College); see also Michael W. Hirschorn, A New-Left Challenger Comes to an Uneasy Peace
with Academe, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 29, 1988, at A3 (describing the movement of
60s student-activists into teaching positions).
126 See ARTHUR AUSTIN, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: OUTSIDERS AND THE STRUGGLE
OVER LEGAL EDUCATION 95, 99 (1998) (noting that Duncan Kennedy first described
deconstruction through the lens of contracts, and that deconstructionist readings are still
popular in undergraduate settings, where such readings originated).
127 Id.
128 See generally Arthur Austin, Antitrust Deconstructed, 22 STETSON L. REV. 1101
(1993) (demonstrating a form of deconstruction that uses antitrust text confrontation -
sentences from the privileged canon facing marginal views - to demonstrate text
encounters).
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better.. .")129 to Bill Gates, rationalize their success while
economists asserting the "God's truth" is in their "Black
Boxes,"130 duke it out over a self-serving privileged view.
Distilled of iconoclastic reform chatter, one issue perseveres - the
effort to moderate the tension between the benefits of the
"invisible hand" of the free market and the values of social
welfare.
A historically correct antitrust deconstruction trace would start
almost three hundred years ago with Mitchel v. Reynolds,131
when the court invited a conflict between privileged and
marginal voices by making a distinction between reasonable and
unreasonable restraints of trade.132 This distinction served as an
even balance between competing interpretations until the
populists achieved privilege status in the Sherman Act of 1890,
which gave the government a prosecutorial blunderbuss by
forbidding "every" contract in restraint of trade.l3 3 In 1911 the
Supreme Court elevated the populist privileged view by
dissolving the Rockefeller empire while marginalizing their
authority with Chief Justice White's deconstruction of the
Sherman Act:134 "every" does not mean "every,"135 thereby
signaling that courts would entertain competing voices from the
margins. From the margins the voice of capitalism got privileged
status in 1920; the Government argued that U.S. Steel's "power
for evil,"136 derived from size alone, constituted monopolization
129 CLARENCE H. CRAMER, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE: FREE AND NOT SO FREE 423 (Little,
Brown & Co. 1972) (quoting J.P. Morgan and noting how he was known for combining
businesses).
130 See But Ceteris Are Never Paribus, FORBES, Dec. 15, 1974, at 22, 23 (citing the
remark attributed to Frank Modigliani, M.I.T. economist, "You can't argue about what's
inside my black box [i.e., economic model] because I made it. The God's truth isn't in the
black box, I am the God's truth!").
131 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
132 See id. (stating that "[gleneral restraints are all void... Particular restraints are
either, without consideration, all of which are void.., or upon a good and adequate
consideration, so as to make it a proper and useful contract.").
133 See 15 U.S.C.1 (2005) (declaring "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal").
134 See Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 45 (1911) (holding the defendant was in
fact a monopoly pursuant to the plain, unambiguous meaning of the statute).
135 See id. at 62 (concluding that "it behooves us to consider the contentions urged on
one side or the other concerning the meaning of the statute, which, if maintained, would
give to it, in some aspects a much wider and in every view at least a somewhat different
significance.").
136 U.S. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 447-48 (1920) (juxtaposing the power for
evil with the actual exercise of evil).
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under the Sherman Act. Acknowledging U.S. Steel's "impressive
size," the Court nevertheless privileged its presence: "[W]e must
adhere to the law, and the law does not make mere size an
offence, or the existence of unexerted power an offense."'137
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,138 the antitrust
trace was jolted into textural nihilism confirming the Pareto
metaphor: antitrust is like a bat, from one angle it resembles a
bird, from another view you see a mouse. 139 With Derridaian zest
Judge Hand taunted competing Interpretive Communities with a
demonstration of self-deconstruction. He started with the
premise that monopoly-in-fact is a protected status. The
privileged reading of the Sherman Act from U.S. Steel still
prevails. "The successful competitor, having been urged to
compete, must not be turned upon when he wins."140 He added
another gospel of the privileged: "size does not determine
guilt."141 Hand went on to buttress the privileged reading by
charting out safe harbors for the monopolist: achieving size by
virtue of natural monopoly, change in consumer tastes, and as a
"survivor ... by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and
industry."142
Having given the "combination"143 crowd the endorsement of a
privileged interpretation Hand opted to self- deconstruct. He
throws the winners into an abyss of a Mensongian cul-de-sac.144
The winner loses by winning as a result of anticipating the
efforts of rivals, by embracing every new opportunity and by
exploiting "a great organization, having the advantage of
experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel."145 Like
137 Id. at 451.
138 U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
139 See EDWARD S. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM
391 (Harvard University Press) (1957) (recalling "Pareto once remarked that the
statements of Karl Marx are like bats; from one angle they resemble birds while from
another view they look like mice. This observation is equally apropos with respect to
antitrust decisions It is possible for the skillful reader to buttress almost any
preconceived notion of what the antitrust laws are about by judicious citation of chapter
and verse.").
140 Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d at 430.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Menand, supra note 103, at 47.
144 See MALCOLM BRADBURY, MY STRANGE QUEST FOR MENSONGE 78 (Penguin 1987).
145 Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d at 431.
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Professor Morris Zapp, Hand cuts off the limb he's sitting on 146 to
extract a privileged reading empty of privilege thereby leaving
the monopolist to live in an antitrust abyss, paralyzed by Hand's
admonition that "no monopolists monopolizes unconscious of
what he is doing."147 Whatever he does, he risks litigation.148
Classic Postmodern irony; in the words of the elusive "Laureate
of Absence," Henri Mensonge: "[T]here is no about about for
anything to be about."149
Hand cunningly deposited Alcoa's deconstruction legacy in the
margins. Obscured by his deft expositions on the effects of the
defendant's exclusionary conduct was the seed for a social benefit
privileged interpretation of the Sherman Act:
It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral
effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each
dependent for his success upon his own skill and
character, to one in which the great mass of those
engaged must accept the direction of a few. These
considerations, which we have suggested only as
possible purposes of the Act, we think the decisions
prove to have been in fact its purposes. 150
Whether, as Professor Dewey suspected, Hand wrote a
"tongue-in-cheek" opinion, 15 1 is open to debate. There is no
doubt, however, that his comments anticipated, if not stimulated,
the public interest movement in antitrust.152 What may have
been Hand's tongue-in-cheek views were elevated to privileged
status by Chief Justice Warren in 1962 when he identified
market deconcentration as the central goal of anti-merger policy,
146 See generally DAVID LODGE, SMALL WORLD: AN ACADEMIC ROMANCE 134
(MacMillan Books 1984) (attempting to become leading academic by "cutting off the limb
he is sitting on").
147 Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d at 432.
148 See DONALD DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 239 (1966) (suggesting
that "If the monopolist responds to the threat of potential competition by keeping prices
low in order to ensure that it does not materialize as actual competition, he violates the
law. If... he charges what the traffic will bear, his monopoly power is presumably
'unreasonably' exercised.").
149 BRADBURY, supra note 144, at 63.
150 Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d at 427.
151 Dewey, supra note 148, at 86.
152 See GREEN, MOORE, WASSERSTEIN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM: THE NADER
STUDY GROUP REPORT ON ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 297 (Mark Green ed. 1971)
(determining that "[e]vil conduct and evil intent are not required; monopoly power,
whether or not exercised, is the offense.").
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specifically mentioning its "threat to other values."153 The notion
that "other [non-economic] values" constituted the privileged
vision of anti-merger enforcement confirmed the presence of
social welfare in the antitrust dictionary. 154
Antitrust is a boneyard of irreconcilable decisions. Supreme
Court opinions have split personalities ranging through
precedent, formalism, economic theory, and "policymaking."155
Out-right reversal is disdained; in a field as impenetrable and
subjective as restraint of trade the Court prefers to maintain
access to an array of options.156 Over the years the decisions have
developed a vocabulary of terms - rule of reason, per se, quick
look, conscious parallelism "plus," "literal" price fixing - that
entice deconstruction. A case like Alcoa leaves an analytical
process enabling successors to justify whatever fits an agenda.
Thus while conventional wisdom may favor the Chicago free
market theme as privileged, it is ultimately at the mercy of the
antitrust split personality. The presence of decisions rejecting a
social welfare rationalization is not conclusive.
III. JUDICIAL DECONSTRUCTION AND SOCIETAL ANTITRUST
"For the Ivy Schools are part of a price-fixing system
that OPEC might envy"157
"The goal, according to university officials, is to make
sure that scholarships are based only on need and to
prevent schools from bidding against each other for
talented applicants."158
153 Brown Show Co., v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962). For a critique of Brown Shoe
see Robert Bork, Ward Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965).
154 See Brown Show, 370 U.S. at 316 (confirming "[t]hroughout the recorded
discussion may be found examples of Congress' fear not only of accelerated concentration
of economic power on economic grounds, but also of the threat to other values .. . ').
155 See Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional
Sherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 266, 309-17 (1986) (discussing that "[i]n approaching
these cases, the Court has also worn three faces; that is, it has assumed three different
and conflicting roles", following precedent, regulating economics and policymaking).
156 See id. at 267 (announcing that "[a]ll the contending antitrust schools agree on
one critical point: that the Sherman Act cannot, and should not, be given a settled
meaning derived from traditional statutory sources.") (footnote omitted).
157 Gary Putka, Do Colleges Collude on Financial Aid?, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1989, at
B1.
158 Paul M. Barrett, Christopher J. Chipello, U.S. Investigates Prestigious
Universities, Colleges for Possible Antitrust Violations, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1989, at B2.
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"Whereas businesses hold down prices to compete,
Northwestern's Mr. Weber adds, many schools 'raise
prices to meet the competition."'159
The Context of the mid-fifties suggests that Antitrust was a
benign shadow. There was no need for lawyers - this was
education, not selling toasters. Over time an informal socio-
ideological commitment became a bureaucracy with detailed
memorials of price-fixing. The ultimate implication of the
memorials came from the evolution of the Academy vision from a
singular focus on the transfer of knowledge to an Intersection of
learning and commerce. 160 Overlap was put on notice of the new
Context by Clark Kerr's Harvard Lecture on the implications of
Federal Grant University (1963) and the fall-out from Milton
Friedman's testimony and the issues raised in Marjorie Webster
(1970).161 With Goldfarb (1975) on the books, the Intersection of
Education and Commerce was evenly balanced and by the late
80's Overlap was in need of a candid Opinion Letter.
Instead they got a civil complaint alleging a conspiracy to fix
prices.162 Harvard's general counsel immediately framed the
defense: "Our practices served the good social purposes of making
sure that a limited amount of financial funds went to the
neediest students."163 The next day every school excepting M.I.T.
consented out, 16 4 prompting a New York Times headline: Ivy
Universities Deny Price-Fixing But Agree to Avoid It in the
Future. 16 5
159 Gary Putka, supra note 32, at Al, A6.
160 See Herschel I. Grossman, The Economics and Politics of Scholarships, ACADEMIC
QUESTIONS, Summer 1995, at 59 (discussing how colleges want to use exceptional
students to attract more prospective students and hence are like any business).
161 See Francis H. Horn, New Knowledge is Power, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1964, at BR12
(book review) (noting that Kerr emphasized the changes to all members of the university
as a result of the increase in federal research programs, which have created the federal
grant university).
162 See U.S. v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 289 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (stating the United
States brought the action after a two year investigation), rev'd and remanded, 5 F.3d 658
(3rd Cir. 1993).
163 Anthony DePalma, Ivy Universities Deny Price-Fixing But Agree to Avoid It in the
Future, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1991, A-1.
164 Because MIT was not a named party in a class action suit by a student they were
not confronted with a treble damage judgment - as were the other schools. If they won,
the other schools could move to have the decree removed. Officials denied "that they are
cooperating on some sort of grand strategy." Scott Jaschik, Overlap Group Could Survive
Ivy League's Agreement to End Collaboration on Financial Aid, Lawyer's Say, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., June 5, 1991, A15-16.
165 DePalma, supra note 163.
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a. United States v. MI.T. I: The Competing Context of Economic
Models
The trial opened with M.I.T. counsel informing the Court "that
before there was a Sherman Act, there was M.I.T."166 He scolded
the Antitrust Division for contaminating Overlap culture with
the taint of commerce: "M.I.T. is unlike any institution that the
antitrust division has ever encountered. M.I.T.'s function is to
teach, to discover, and to build ... yet in the eyes of the antitrust
division, such an institution is indistinguishable from a
manufacturer of toaster ovens or porcelain fixtures."167 The
lecture emphasized that higher education does not square with
the smoke stack corporate profit-maximization sharehold
dividend model.168 Under a "multiattribute objective function"169
system in which students are both consumers and producers of a
college education, predictions and judgments on economic effects
are problematical. "Therefore, there is no way to predict, as a
matter of theory, whether schools would find it in their interest
to raise prices to students if it would be profitable to do so."170
The Government economist countered by addressing the nuts
and bolts of education: M.I.T. and other schools compete for
students, faculty, and financial support and in the process seek
to maximize revenues over costs. The revenue excess - the
academic dividend - goes to the institution's shareholders -
administrators and faculty - in "greater travel funds, higher
faculty salaries, improved facilities, etc."171 Hence, the only
difference between the two models "is the way in which they
consume profits - for-profit entities distribute profits among the
166 Roger Parloff, Conceptual Combat, AM. LAWYER, Nov. 1992, at 82.
167 Id.
168 'IV.I.T. contends that while economic theory can predict the behavior of a for-
profit firm, since by definition its primary motivation is profit-maximization, economic
theory cannot predict the consequences of cooperative behavior among non-profit
institutions such as colleges, since non-profit educational institutions have diverse
interests, some of which may conflict with the goal of profit-maximization. M.I.T.
contends that basic economic theory rejects a presumption that bona fide non-profit
organizations that act cooperatively will do so in a way that harms the consumer." U.S. v.
Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 302 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
169 Dennis W. Carlton, Gustavo E. Bamberger, Roy J. Epstein, Antitrust and Higher
Education: Was there a Conspiracy to Restrict Financial Aid, NBER Working Paper No:
4998, Jan. 1995, at 10 (stating "it is simply not possible to predict inevitable consequences
from cooperative price setting.").
170 Id.
171 Brown, 805 F. Supp. at 302 n.9.
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owners, while non-profits entities distribute profits within the
organization."172 A distinction with no economic distinction. And
so long as they spend it on something, it constitutes an
accounting "cost."173 Economists call it amenities that can have
x-inefficiency effects.174 In academe, it's known as the perk
system. 175
M.I. T. I is a textbook confrontation between privileged and
marginal views. From the privileged vantage, the defendant
argued that the Emersonian vision of higher education is
committed to providing an intellectual experience: "The pursuit
of truth for its own sake"176 and therefore beyond Sherman Act
jurisdiction. They ignored Clark Kerr's voice from the margin
announcing the "transformation" of the university into a
172 Id.
173 Thomas Sowell, The Scandal of College Tuition, COMMENTARY, Aug., 1992, at 23
(explaining "whatever colleges and universities choose to spend their money on is called a
cost"); see Grossman, supra note 160, at 59 (noting that tax laws allow private colleges to
designate themselves not-for-profit enterprises, which in turn allows them to include in
their costs some amounts that are really profits).
174 See Carlson, Shepherd, supra note 42, at 580-81.
Second, institutions sometimes provide benefits to their faculty, students, and staff,
even if the benefits do not increase prestige, or even if the funds that are spent on
the benefits would increase prestige more if they were spent in other ways. For
example, certain faculty and staff receive salaries and amenities, such as expensive
office furnishings or the use of a faculty club, even if the expenses are unnecessary
to retain the faculty and staff. We call expenditures that do not maximize prestige
'X-inefficiency.' The degree to which institutions engage in X-inefficiency is
uncertain. On one hand, Overlap eliminates price competition in the market for
undergraduate education and provides increased market power to elite institutions.
Standard X-inefficiency theory predicts that the absence of robust market
discipline breeds X-inefficiency. Staff and faculty have an incentive to create
comfort for themselves. Like managers of a firm that is insulated from competitive
pressure, the staff and faculty that decide to engage in X-efficiency spending
benefit directly from it.
Id.
175 Id. "In addition, amenity competition consumed a substantial portion of funds
that Overlap institutions could otherwise have devoted to other uses, such as to
endowment growth and to aid for needy students. Competitive pressure to attract
students created an incentive to devote to amenity competition a significant part of the
net revenues that Overlap created that is of the transfers from star students.
Consequently, less revenue remained for other uses." Id. The Government argued "that
Overlap schools admitted using their aid formula to save money - at the expense of
students' families. It quotes a Harvard official as saying that formula helped the school
save $250,000 for one freshman class, and an M.I.T. official as saying under oath that his
school saved $2,000 per needy applicant in 1985 by using its 'more sophisticated approach'
to determine need." Huntley Collins, Inside Look at Colleges' Data Pool Facing Antitrust
Action; PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, April 13, 1992, at A01.
176 ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 33 (Transaction
Publishing 1995) (1936).
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commercially driven community.1 77 They likewise disregarded
Goldfarb which introduced the new reality from the margin by
rejecting Marjorie Webster's exclusion from coverage of
traditionally noncommercial restraints of trade unless they were
commercially motivated.178  The Trial Court's conclusion:
"[E]xemptions should be granted warily" and given the
magnitude of "M.I.T.'s economic activity" the privileged view of
education as noncommercial was "pure sophistry."179 The
exchange of money between student and school "is 'commerce' in
the most common usage of that word."iso
On the substantive issue the Government backed its argument
for a profit-maximizing context with evidence demonstrating a
connection between Overlap and price. MIT argued that the
multi-purpose objectives of a non-profit model defied the
simplistic assumption of a for-profit system. The battle of the
experts was a wash - persuasive but inconclusive. The Court
buried the impasse by adopting a "facial" reading of the facts.
The Court's use of an "abbreviated" rule of reason-deemed
appropriate for "inherently suspect"181 conduct-restricted inquiry
to the facial implications of the evidence. The Court discerned
the manifest anticompetitive intent of Overlap in the Ivy Overlap
Agreement whereby "member institutions purposefully
removed.. .price considerations and price competition .... "1 82 In
addition to rendering conflicting expert testimony irrelevant, a
"quick look" evaluation shifted a "heavy burden" on MIT to rebut
with a procompetitive explanation.183 It was a burden that under
precedent could not be satisfied with a proffer of social welfare
arguments. The Judge, perhaps mindful of the defense's opening
remarks, concluded: "The court, is obligated... to judge Overlap
against a different framework: that of the Sherman Act, which,
177 See The Knowledge Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1963, at 200 (acknowledging
Clark Kerr's lectures are important for trying to assess the vast changes under way in
higher learning).
178 See Julie L. Seitz, Comment, Consideration of Noneconomic Procompetitive
Justifications in the MITAntitrust Case, 44 EMORY L. J. 395, 406 (stating that in Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, the Supreme Court rejected a total exclusion of professional
organizations from the antitrust laws and also appeared to reject the motivation
requirement from Marjorie Webster).
179 U.S. v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 298 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
180 Id. (citing Goldfarb v. VA State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787-88 (1975)).
181 Id. at 303.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 304.
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not as old as MIT, has nevertheless for more than a century
guided our Nation's economic polices."184
b. United States v. M.I. T. II. Price Fixing as a Social Benefit
A conventional linear doctrinal analysis would criticize the
Third Circuit for its questionable reading of relevant
precedent, 8 5 specifically Supreme Court decisions dealing with
the intersection of the Sherman Act and social benefit
justification. Professional Engineers 186 and Indiana Federation
of Dentists 187 are cited for the proposition that it is
impermissible to justify restraints of trade imposed for social
welfare if they inhibit free market forces.188 Judge Cowen evaded
this embargo with a razor thin distinction: Overlap did not
subvert market forces; instead it enhanced consumer choices.
"[I]t purports only to seek to extend a service to qualified
students who are financially 'needy' and would not otherwise be
able to afford the high cost of education at M.I.T."189 In fact,
Overlap bureaucratically sought to displace, via forced mediation,
all market choices. 190 In 1990, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
Professional Engineers by holding that the Sherman Act does not
tolerate "inquiry into the question whether competition is good or
bad."191
184 Id. at 307 (reviewing financial aid programs of colleges across United States).
185 See Michael C. Petronio, Comment, Eliminating the Social Cost of Higher
Education: The Third Circuit Allows Social Welfare Benefits to Justify Horizontal
Restraints of Trade in United States v. Brown University, 83 GEO. L.J. 189 (1994)
(critiquing holding of United States v. Brown University); Julie Seitz, Consideration of
Noneconomic Procompetitive Justifications in the M.I.T. Antitrust Case, 44 EMORY L.J.
395 (1995) (reasoning that appellate court mistakenly remanded case to district court);
Srikanth Srinivasan, Comment, College Financial Aid and Antitrust: Applying the
Sherman Act to Collaborative Non-Profit Activity, 46 STAN. L. REV. 919 (1994) (proposing
an alternative standard); see also Richard Morrison, Comment, Price Fixing Among Elite
Colleges and Universities, 59 CHI. L. REV. 807 (1992) (stating that fixing financial aid
awards is illegal and policies should be changed).
186 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
187 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
188 Petronio, supra note 185, at 212 ('The Supreme Court's analysis in these two
cases demonstrates that it has unambiguously removed social welfare justifications from
the antitrust equation").
189 U.S. v. Brown Univ, 5 F.3d. 658, 677 (3rd Cir. 1993) (noting that Overlap did not
seek to withhold benefits).
190 See generally Id. at 665 (discussing district court holding prohibiting M.I.T. from
entering into combinations or conspiracies which may have effect of determining financial
awards).
191 FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n., 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1970).
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The Court of Appeals tracked the District Court on "trade or
commerce" virtually lockstep.192 The perfunctory acceptance of
the government's argument on jurisdiction was a nod to get an
opportunity to register a deconstruction of academic socio-
ideological price-fixing.193 Judge Cowen scowled into the furnace
of price-fixing to "face the trouble already there"194  by
announcing that "per se rules of illegality are judicial
constructs"195 derived from economic predictions. By invoking
social constructionism, a technique for criticism and power
shifting, he prefaced a deconstructive interpretation. As a
liberating and all-purpose wrecking ball for breaking down
conventional wisdom and authoritarian dialogue, social
construction is anathema to the dominant voice of the privileged
text. "The clain of social construction, then, is supposed to jolt
our pre-theoretical commitments by taking something that we
previously thought to be natural/universalinflexible and instead
showing it to be constructed - local - deconstructable."196
As a deconstructionist Judge Cowen starts with the accepted
Antitrust assumption that any direct interference with pricing
among rivals is per se illegal: standard ukase from the Footnote
59 text. To the social constructionalist this is not an inevitable
construction: "Far from being inevitable, [it] is the contingent up-
shot of historical events."197 To establish the lack of inevitability,
Judge Cowen surmises that since Overlap conduct has satisfied
the threshold of price interference only in a "literal sense ... [it]
192 This was criticized for assuming Trade or Commerce without a threshold finding
on "competence - the power of the executive, an administrative agency, the courts, or
other statutory implementors to act under the mandate of a particular, proper delegation
of jurisdictional power - in this instance, the Sherman Act." Nelson 0. Fitts, A Critique of
Noncommercial Justifications for Sherman Act Violations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 478, 482 n.
18 (1999). (discussing separate categories of jurisdiction and competence). A positive
finding on Trade or Commerce would have compelled the Court to "move on to its
substantive economic analysis free of justicatory excuses." Id. at 496.
193 The Court expressly reserved the right to consider the influences of
"congressionally-recognized and important social welfare goals ... [which] will influence
whether this conduct violates the Sherman Act." Brown, 5 F. 3d. at 668.
194 Denis Donoghue, FEROCIOUS ALPHABETS 185 (1984). Reference to Paul deMan's
deconstruction technique.
195 Brown, 5 F. 3d. at 677 (3rd Cir. 1993) (stating that per se rules can also be based
on economic predictions).
196 Douglas Litowitz, The Social Construction of Law: Explanations and Implications,
STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 215, 217 (ed. Austin Sarat & Patricia Ewick
2000).
197 Ian Hacking, ARE YOU A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST? Lingua Franca, May/June
1999, at 65, 66. See Ian Hacking, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? (2002).
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does not mean that it automatically qualifies as per se illegal
price-fixing." 98  He referenced the Supreme Court's
acknowledgement that "literalness is overly simplistic and often
overbroad."i 99 Literalness, as Robert Bork suggested in 1965
while a Yale antitrust law professor "demonstrates that those
rules... are inadequate", 200 they lack context. To Cowen,
Goldfarb was merely a caution, a warning signal to courts to
avoid blindly succumbing to adherence to literal non-contextual
simplicity.201
A deconstructionist subverts the ostensible certainty of words
by demonstrating that "the different intentions, therefore the
different meanings, are fixed by the differences in contexts."202
For Overlap the context is higher education, a field implicating
sociopolitical objectives "that conflict with the goal of pure profit
maximization." 203 Hence a new "relevant context"204 of "pure
altruistic motive" 205 prompts the Court to reject per se. "We thus
agree with the district court that Overlap must be judged under
the rule of reason."206 That was, however, the only point of
agreement - merely the first prong of Judge Cowan's
deconstruction.
c. Sociology Under the Rule of Reason
For the ironic reader belief is always accompanied by
the belief that what one believes cannot be the full
198 Brown, 5 F.3d at 670 (quoting Broadcast Music Inc. v. C.B.S., 441 U.S. 1, 8
(1979)).
199 Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (holding
that nonexclusive blanket licenses should undergo an examination under rule of reason
and remanding to district court for determination).
200 Robert Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 777 (1965).
201 Justice Cowen read Goldfarb as counseling "against applying traditional antitrust
rules outside of conventional business contexts." See Brown, 5 F.3d at 670.
202 Gerald Graff, Determinacy/Indeterminacy in CRITICAL TERMS FOR LITERARY
STUDY 166 (ed. Frank Lentricchia, Thomas McLaughlin 1990).
203 Brown, 5 F.3d at 677 (noting that courts will consider party's intent in its
judgment).
204 "In other words, determining the relevant context of an utterance is a process just
as dependent on inference as any other part of the interpretive process, and therefore just
as open to dispute." Graff, supra note 202, at 167.
205 Brown, 5 F.3d at 672 (reasoning that Overlap should not be declared per se
unreasonable).
206 Id.
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story: there is always something further, something
more, to be understood in understanding. 207
Chicago School economists prefer Rule of Reason; 208 it denies
populist inclined judges the opportunity to contour facts to fit
anti-defendant per se categories.209 Rule of reason compels
analysis and has been used by Chicago as a Trojan Horse to
engage in a dialogue over competing paradigms 210 - with the
edge inevitably going to efficiency economics. 211 Relying on a
heavy dose of deconstruction irony the Third Circuit turned
Chicago ideology on its head.
Judge Cowen refused to accept the autonomy of Chicago
economics as the controlling privileged guide for antitrust policy
and analysis. He initiated his campaign by valorizing M.I.T.'s
argument that Overlap promoted "socio-economic diversity"
which enhanced competition by improving the "quality" and
"vitality" of education at Overlap schools. 212 He then notes that
the Supreme Court "has recognized improvement in the quality
of a product or service that enhances the public desire for that
product or service as one possible pro-competitive virtue."213 In
resorting to non-quantifiable criteria on an arcane and open-
ended subject such as diversity,2 14 the Court injects sociology,
politics and psychology into a subject that the Chicago economist
207 William Ray, LITERARY MEANING: FROM PHENOMENOLOGY TO DECONSTRUCTION
188 (1984).
208 See Chicago Board of Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (stating an accepted
definition of rule of reason).
209 Petronio, supra note 185, at 196-98 (comparing rule of reason with per se
illegality).
210 "Business practices tested under a full Rule of Reason, with no presumptions
based on any set of facts and with the burden of showing anticompetitive effect on the
plaintiff, will usually turn out to be legal." Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust
Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1978).
211 Arthur Austin, Antitrust Reaction to the Merger Wave: The Revolution vs. the
Counterrevolution, 66 N.C. L. REV. 931, 948-49 (1988) (stating that the per se rule of
reason is "anathema to the aspirations of Chicago economists).
212 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 674 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting MIT's
contention that by promoting socio-economic diversity, Overlap contributed to quality of
education offered by schools).
213 Id.
214 "Diversity is a large idea in the way that Wyoming is a large state: it is a big part
of everyone's map of America, but there is not much there." PETER W. WOOD, DIVERSITY:
THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT 1 (2003). For a quick, but intelligent, read on the
complexities of diversity, see Alan Wolfe, The One and the Many, NEW REPUBLIC, June 9,
2003, at 26. (Review of Peter H. Shuck, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT
A DISTANCE (2003)).
2006]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
would apply rational empirically based analysis. 215 Blending
sociology and economics also enables Judge Cowen to objectify
value judgments on Overlap as a vehicle for improving consumer
choice: "Enhancement of consumer choice is a traditional
objective of the antitrust laws and has been acknowledged as a
pro-competitive benefit."216 In fact, inspiring desire for a product
is often a function of product differentiation, disdained as
wasteful by many economists. 217
Deconstruction irony continues to churn when Cowen revises
the model of competition to include "the social ideal of equality of
educational access and opportunity."218 He achieves this by first
tolerating the District Court's reliance on precedent rejecting
illegality for trade restraints that deny consumers the
opportunity to make imprudent decisions in an otherwise
competitive market.2 19 He then finesses Overlap's price-fixing by
referencing its enhancement of competition "by broadening the
socio-economic sphere of its potential student body."220 Instead of
suppressing competition, as had occurred in Professional
Engineers, Overlap merely regulated competition in order "to
enhance it, while also deriving certain social benefits."221 To
further irritate the Chicago School, Judge Cowen said: "If the
215 Cowen gets support from an emerging paradigm in economics that disputes
"rational economics": "Present-day economists may know more than medieval
astronomers, but they too are captives of a single overarching idea: that most people in
everyday life are rational calculators of their own self-interest - that they are, in economic
jargon, maximizers of utility. Given a sufficient amount of information, they will come to
the logically correct decision every time. Modern conventional economics is not just a
series of calculations about trade or jobs or money. It is a theory about human behavior.
And it is a theory that, to say the least, deserves more scrutiny than it normally gets."
Alan Ehrenhalt, Keepers of the Dismal Faith, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1997, at E13. See also
Mark Bauerlein, The Two Cultures Again: Tilting Against Objectivity, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Nov. 16, 2001, at B14; Peter Monaghan, Taking On 'Rational Man': Dissident
Economists Fight for a Niche in the Discipline, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 24, 2003, at
A12; Louis Uchitelle, A Challenge to Scientific Economics, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 23, 1999, at
B7; Robert Kuttner, The Poverty of Economics, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb., 1985, at 74.
216 See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 675.
217 See Arthur Austin, Antitrust Proscription and the Mass Media, DUKE L.J. 1021,
1036-38, 1057-64 (1968) (explaining how economists see advertising as a waste of
resources).
218 Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 675.
219 See id. at 673-74. "We therefore agree that Overlap 'requires some competitive
justification even in the absence of a detailed market analysis."' Id. at 673.
220 Id. at 677.
221 Id. In Professional Engineers the Court struck down a ban on competitive bidding
intended to shield the public from a safety threat from low bids by engineers culling costs
to get business. "[T]he Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the
assumption that competition itself is unreasonable." National Soc. of Professional
Engineers v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
[Vol. 2 l":1
IVYLEA G UE PRICE-FING
rule of reason analysis leads to this conclusion, then indeed
Overlap will be beyond the scope of the prohibition of the
Sherman Act."222 Then, with a deconstruction flourish, the Judge
converts "equality of educational access and opportunity" into a
commodity, a "common good that should be extended to as wide a
range of individuals from as broad a range of socio-economic
backgrounds as possible."223 Irony trumps Chicago to open the
door for a re-emergence of societal antitrust with all of its trade
offs - including officious governmental interference. 224 Under
Judge Cowen's skillful deconstruction M.I.T. - and by implication
the Ivies - would have been evaluated under a Rule of Reason
analysis with instructions to consider social welfare activities.
IV. BETWEEN THE ROCK OF EDUCATION AND THE HARD PLACE OF
ANTITRUST
"Even as public attention has been riveted on matters
of principle such as affirmative action... the American
university has been reinventing itself in response to
intensified competitive pressures. Entrepreneurial
ambition, which used to be regarded in academia as a
necessary evil, has become a virtue."225
The Emersonian side of the Academy's Intersection with
Commerce produces a steady stream of lament over the
"corporatizing" of higher education. 226 To critics the problem
starts with the enormous endowments that the elite schools can
exploit to influence and make money. 227 Yet, as Derek Bok,
222 Brown Univ. 5 F.3d at 677.
223 Id. at 678.
224 See Arthur Austin, Book Review, Antitrust Law and Economics (3rd ed.) by Ernest
Gellhorn, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 193, 197 n.25 (explaining that the "vigorous campaigns" of
societal antitrust "argue that the antitrust laws should be used to proscribe "persuasive"
advertising, to declare annual automobile style changes an unfair method of competition,
and attack market concentration to reduce poverty and crime."). But see Carlton,
Bamberger & Epstein, supra note 169, at 144-46.
225 DAVID L. KIRP, SHAKESPEARE, EINSTEIN, AND THE BOTTOM LINE: THE MARKETING
OF HIGHER EDUCATION 3-4 (2003).
226 See Henry A. Giroux, NeoLiberalism, Corporate Culture, and the Promise of
Higher Education, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 425 (2002) (criticizing the growing influence
corporate culture has on university life).
227 John Hechinger, When $26 Billion Isn't Enough, WALL ST. J., (Pursuits), Dec. 17,
2005, p. 1 (noting that while higher education gets $24 billion in donations annually, many
wealthy colleges are withdrawing less than 5% from their endowments); Johanna
Berkman, Harvard's Hoard, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, June 24, 2001, at 38 (discussing
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former president of Harvard says: "There is never enough money
to satisfy their desires." 228 Schools have become capitalist
entrepreneurs, investing in faculty run companies, collaborating
with outsiders on profitable patent research, sponsoring internet
education, cajoling federal grant freebies, 229 and a classic Flem
Snopes scam - franchising school logos for personalized alumni
caskets. 230
"Everything nowadays," opines Richard Posner, "is
businesslike, rule bound, disenchanted."231 Academic aspirations
are conducted within the imperatives of profit center
departments in which administrative decisions are consistent
with commercial rationalization. 232 The consequence is the co-
mingling of the Emersonian and commercial components,
exposing the educational functions to risks of trade. In this
context a consent settlement was a rational response to the
enigmatic consequences of an adverse judgment on the merits.
Subsequent events demonstrated the prudence of a settlement
that got rid of the inhibiting effects of litigation 233, avoided a
serious drain on endowment and human resources while playing
Harvard's $19 billion endowment and its fundraising efforts); David L. Marcus, The New
College All-Stars, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 13, 2000, at 49 (discussing the money
managers hired to oversee universities' large endowments).
228 Derek Bok, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 9 (2003).
229 See Richard Posner, The University as Business, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jun. 2002,
at 21 (noting that major universities have become multi-hundred-million enterprises,
"and they behave accordingly and are managed accordingly); Goldie Blumenstyk, Income
from University Licenses on Patents Exceeded $12-Billion, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar.
22, 2002, at A31 (discussing how several universities are cashing in on royalties for the
right to use inventions); Karen W. Arenson, Columbia Sets Pace in Profiting Off Research,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2000, at B-1 (discussing Columbia's creation of Columbia Media
Enterprises, designed to "nurture digital projects"); Eval Press & Jennifer Washburn, The
Kept University, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2000, at 39 (discussing how Novartis, a Swiss
pharmaceutical company, gave Berkeley $25 million to fund research).
230 Anne Marie Chaker, The New School Spirit: Burial Plots for Alums, WALL ST. J.,
July 20, 2003, at Dl. Students are familiar with another manifestation of academic
capitalism - "luxury learning"- resort style extras, overseas jaunts, free phones, or any
other marketing ploy to get at nonacademic discretionary items. See Jonathan B.
Weinbach, Luxury Learning, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2000, at W-1; Elizabeth Bernstein,
College With All the Perks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2003, at W-1; Elizabeth Bernstein, The
Deluxe Semester Abroad, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2003, at W-1; Sara Rimer, For a Price,
Colleges Offer Students Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at A-1; Jonathan Kaufman, At
Elite Universities, A Culture of Money Highlights Class Divide, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2001,
at A-1.
231 Posner, supra note 229.
232 Id. (discussing how universities have become very similar to businesses while
their faculty ironically criticizes capitalism).
233 Allowing MIT and other schools to engage in Overlap-type behavior. Carlton,
Bamberger & Epstein, supra note 169, at 146.
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the victim role to the government's "grossly unfair" charges. 234
The decree also deflected attention from a potentially more
serious problem.
a. The Risk of a Type I Price Fixing Conspiracy
Government documents used as the basis for a May 8, 1992,
Wall Street Journal article, revealed that the Ivies were
vulnerable to charges that they colluded to fix faculty salaries
and agreed on tuition increases. 235 The argument that tuition
discounting was charity and therefore beyond Sherman Act
jurisdiction is irrelevant to charges of interfering in the pricing of
more obvious manifestations of trade - costs and wages. Tuition
and wages could not be rationalized as charity. 236 Exposed as
Type 1 (per se) price-fixers, Overlap would forfeit the "high
moral" ground position. 237
From academic years 1979-80 to 1986-87 the Council of Ivy
League Presidents met annually to exchange information. 238
According to the Wall Street Journal a typical meeting - such as
the one conducted December 3, 1986, at the Harvard Club in
New York City - begin with a brief discussion of "local" concerns
such as sexual harassment, freshman football, animal-rights
activists, then proceed on to the "traditional budget colloquy." 239
234 DePalma, supra note 163 at A-1. A comment attributed to Benno Schmidt Jr.,
president of Yale, who later resigned to lead a company involved in for-profit secondary
education.
235 "Some of the documents revealing the private Ivy meetings were obtained through
a Freedom of Information Act request. Others are part of the government's filings in a
case that may go on trial next month in federal district court in Philadelphia." Gary
Putka, Class Actions: Ivy League Discussions on Finances Extended to Tuition and
Salaries, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1992, at Al, A5.
236 Id., at Al, A5 (discussing the so-called "illegal price-fixing arrangement" wherein
certain Ivy League schools planned both tuition and salary increases).
237 "Like price-fixing, wage-fixing is forbidden under Section 1 of the 1890 Sherman
Antitrust Act, which has been interpreted to hold that any agreement between
competitors that aims to affect price - or effectively does so - is illegal. True, government
lawyers would have had a tougher time proving collusion on salaries and tuition than on
financial aid: While the schools had an explicit policy of discussing aid awards, they were
more discreet about trading salary and tuition figures. If the Justice Department had
been able to make such a case, however, the universities would have had no high moral
ground to stand on," Liza Mundy, The Fixers: How They May Have Tampered With Your
Pay, LINGUA FRANCA, Nov/Dec., 1992, at 28.
238 Putka, supra note 235, at A5 ("[i]nternal Ivy documents obtained by the
government show the schools' presidents met... and discussed the following academic
year's tuitions, and sometimes salaries.").
239 Mundy, supra note 237, at 29 (detailing the topics that were discussed at the
Harvard Club meeting of December 1986).
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Derek Bok of Harvard announced a 5.8 percent to 5.9 percent
tuition increase, Princeton settled on 6.25 percent, the others,
excepting Cornel124o and Dartmouth, came in within a 5.8
percent - 7.5 percent increase range. Salary increases were 5
percent to 6.25 percent. Dartmouth prompted an "audible
gasp... followed by vigorous drubbing" 241 with salary and
tuition projections of 8 percent to 8.5 percent. In a subsequent
memo the Dartmouth President wrote: "[W]e will need to rethink
our proposed salary and tuition scheduled increases and do so
rather promptly."242 After Dartmouth folded, Overlap's range of
tuitions went from $16, 841 to $17,000, a spread of $359
(excepting Cornell).
As a conscious parallelism scenario in which price and cost
decisions occur in tandem among a small group of rivals, the
primary legal issue is proof of an agreement. 243 This requires
evidence of conduct beyond uniformity of pricing - "plus"
factors. 244 Assuming the credibility of the Wall Street Journal
articles it is possible to posit a sufficient level of "pluses" to get a
case to the jury. Efforts to police the parallelism indicates that
school officials assumed they had an agreement. They
"squabbled bitterly" over alleged cheating. Accusing Harvard of
unilaterally reducing net tuition to a student accepted by both
schools, a Dartmouth official wrote: "Either we have an
agreement we all stick to or we do not have an agreement."245
Efforts to get Stanford - who "enraged the Ivies by wooing top
students with more generous offers" 246 - on board likewise
240 Cornell was subsidized by New York State. Putka, supra note 235, at Al, A5.
241 Mundy, supra note 237, at 29.
242 Id.
243 "[Clonscious parallelism is devoid of anything that might reasonably be called
agreement when it involves simply the independent responses of a group of competitors to
the same set of economic facts - independent in the sense that each would have made the
same decision for himself even though his competitors decided otherwise. But the
consciously parallel decisions of oligopolists in setting their basic prices, which are
interdependent in that they depend on competitors setting the same price, are not nearly
so easily disposed of on the ground that no agreement is involved." Donald F. Turner, The
Definition of Agreement Under The Sherman Act, 75 HARD. L. REV. 655, 663-66 (1962).
244 "However, parallel pricing, without more, does not itself establish a violation of
the Sherman Act. Courts require additional evidence which they have described as 'plus
factors.' Examples of these 'plus factors' include actions contrary to a defendant's self-
interest, product uniformity, exchange of price information and opportunity to meet, and
a common motive to conspire in a large number of communications" (citations omitted).
Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 1166, 1168 (6th Cir. 1995).




constitutes "plus" evidence of efforts to protect the parallelism
strategy. "We want them to get enough on our wavelength in
need analysis to look like one of the Ivies, meaning not off the
reservation too often."247 Moreover, Stanford's rejection of an
offer to join because of reservations over antitrust is a persuasive
"plus," as is their request to delete all references to a "common"
agreement in communications. On Stanford's intransigence, a
Yale official said: "I guess they are just too paranoid on the
subject of collusion."248 One official saw a need for legal counsel:
"I believe it will be necessary to get some first class talent
involved in this one."249
Lawyers charged with the responsibility to draft opinion letters
would know that the pluses would likely get jury evaluation.
After acknowledging that a "jury and a judge could have gone
either way," an Emory University law professor added that if his
president asked him on the propriety of meeting with Duke and
Vanderbilt to discuss tuition and salaries he would "tell him he
was crazy - don't do it."250 A Columbia law professor was equally
blunt: "if this were Ford and General Motors getting together to
set prices or executive compensations . . . the only questions
would be which prison the executives would go to."251
All of the Overlap Presidents were experienced in negotiating
the Byzantine dark alleys of the elite wing of the academy.
Three were former law school deans - Bok walked from Harvard
Law School to the President's office while Presidents Schmidt of
Yale and Sovern of Columbia had deaned at Columbia Law
School. McLaughlin of Dartmouth was an M.B.A., Bowen of
Princeton an economist, 252 Swearer of Brown a political scientist
while as a historian, Hackney of Penn, was the only one with a
humanities background. 253  And any problems with
247 Id. "A secret 1986 attempt to bring Stanford into the fold, dubbed 'Operation
Highstick,' failed because Stanford, according to electronic mail messages among the Ivy
schools, worried that the Ivies were colluding illegally." Id.
248 Id.
249 Scott Jaschik, Colleges Question Effectiveness of Overlap Group, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., May 20, 1992, at 6.
250 Putka, supra note 235, at A2.
251 Mundy, supra note 237, at 1.
252 Bowen and Bok subsequently co-authored THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (2003).
253 Paul Gray, President of M.I.T., an engineer, attended the meetings in 1979, 1981,
and 1983, exchanging tuition and salary data. In a memo he mentioned "Some concerns
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comprehending the complexities of the Sherman Act could have
been explained by Bok - a former antitrust professor.254
Considering all that was on the table one can surmise that as
risk averse managers the group fully appreciated the benefits of
burying the record of their meetings in a consent decree. 255
b. Resurrection Through Settlement and Exemption
Accepting the gloss of agreeing not to agree at meetings and
not to fix faculty salaries in exchange for a ten year expiration
date gave Overlap a window to exercise their considerable
lobbying leverage. 256 They were favored by Zeitgeist. The trifecta
of education as a national priority, affirmative action as an
entitlement, anchored by diversity as the reigning social
imperative, have been Beltway icons for decades. A low cost
college education is boilerplate rhetoric in every political
campaign. They also could count on a favorable media who
viewed the case as counter productive, 257 summarized in the
voice of public intellectuals like David Riesman: "They're
defending an idea where these institutions truly were doing
something wonderful."258
Overlap used the decree window as a platform for
rehabilitation, negotiating a statutory exemption that tripped in
expressed: 1) Are we pricing ourselves out of the market? 2) Increases at 7-8% level will
bring public criticism." Putka, supra note 235, at A5.
254 If his article on mergers (Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960)) is any indication; it would have been long,
thorough, and inconclusive. See Austin, supra note 126, at 48-50.
255 That prohibited: "(I) Entering into, directly or indirectly, any contract, agreement,
understanding, arrangement, plan, program, combination, or conspiracy with any other
college or university or its officers, directors, agents, employees, trustees, or governing
board members to fix, establish, raise, stabilize, or maintain student fees or faculty
salaries." U.S. v. Brown University et al, Proposed Consent Judgment, 56 FR 26156
(June 6, 1991).
256 "Already, the Ivy League members are lobbying Congress to include a provision in
the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act that would allow institutions to agree, as
a group, to award aid based solely on need, provided that they do not coordinate aid
determinations." Scott Jaschik, supra note 249, at 3.
257 "The case received widespread news coverage and editorials supporting the
school's policy and MIT's decision to fight the government appeared in several major
newspapers, including the N.Y. Times, L.A. Times, Washington Post, Boston Globe, and
the Philadelphia Inquirer." Carlton, Bamberger, Epstein, supra note 168, at 1.
258 Anthony DePalma, In Trial, MIT. to Defend Trading Student Aid Data, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1992, at A17.
[Vol. 21:1
IVYLEA GUE PRICE-FIXVG
when the decree expired in 2001.259 The exemptions Purpose
statement explains the justification for the Overlap resurrection:
"The need-based financial aid system serves social
goals that the antitrust laws do not adequately
address-namely, making financial aid available to
the broadest number of students solely on the basis of
demonstrated need. Without it, the schools would be
required to compete, through financial aid awards, for
the very top students. Those very top students would
get all of the aid available which would be more than
their demonstrated need. The rest would get less than
their demonstrated need or none at all. Ultimately,
such a system would serve to undermine the
principles of need-based aid and need-blind
admissions. No student who is otherwise qualified
ought to be denied the opportunity to go to one of the
nation's most prestigious schools because of the
financial situation of his or her family."260
To the deconstructionist, silence speaks. Hence the lack of
committee hearings on the Exemption is testimony to the
energetic influence of the Overlap lobby. The Judiciary
Committee's Report pays homage to the Prestige Cartel, noting
the commitment to the social cause of need-blind aid by "a
number of prestigious colleges and universities."261 The Report
emphasized the importance of eliminating socioeconomic barriers
to attending "the nations most prestigious schools."262
The disconnect of the Academy from antitrust was empowered
by the 568 President's Working Group, a bureaucracy named
after the Exemption section number that permits schools who
agree to an exclusive commitment to need-based aid and to
collaborate on needs criteria, exchange applicant data, and use
an independent third party to exchange information on cross-
school applicants. The goal: families "with similar financial
profiles should contribute similar amounts."263
259 Application of Antitrust Laws to Award of Need-Based Educational Aid, 115 Stat.
648, 2001.
260 Report to Accompany H.R. 768, House of the Judiciary, Need-Based Educational
Aid Act of 2001, April 3, 2001.
261 Need Based Educational Aid Act of 2001: Hearing on H.R. 768 before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001).
262 Id.
263 The 568 Presidents' Working Group, http://www.news.cornell.edu/releases
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As a congressionally sanctioned trade association of elite
schools who cater to the same student market, the President's
Group walks a delicate line. While exchange of wage information
is expressly forbidden, the collaborative bureaucracy implicates
the threat of an Adam Smith scenario of invitation to
collusion.264 It is customary for trade associations to emphasize
preventative antitrust.265 Meetings are scripted while taping is
imposed for discussion of sensitive topics. The Smith problem
occurs when the script ends and the cocktails flow. For the
President's Group there is an added risk of scrutiny emanating
from the political context surrounding the Overlap investigation.
In the rumor cacophony following the media exposure of the
government's interest in Ivy League tuition the consensus settled
on political motivation. It was either John Sununu, Bush I aid,
who, with college age children, was incensed at rising tuition,266
or Attorney General Thornburg's attempt at "cultural bashing" to
seek blue collar support for a Senate run (which he lost).267 The
most rational explanation commingles a Wall Street Journal
article268 describing the Overlap process with the resounding
spike in tuition during the 1980's.269 The article projected the
impression of the classic "smoke-filled room" 2 70 akin to Dirty
Helen's 2 71 and a motive to "end a bidding war."2 72
/JulyO1/568.presidents.report.html (adding that institutions should evaluate both income
and assets).
264 See Peter Carstensen, Colleges and Student Aid: Collusion or Competition?,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 10, 2001, at 24. "On the face of it, their efforts appear to be
well-meaning, but how their recommendations play out will certainly bear watching. The
568 group's 'consensus' strategy invites high-price, brand name private institutions to
eliminate price competition by private, collective action. And who would benefit then?
The students? Or the colleges themselves, operating much like a cartel?" Id.
265 See id.."... present activity may be a continuation of past misconduct..." Id.
266 See generally Jaschik, supra note 33 (noting the investigation was motivated by
the Bush-Regan adminstrations).
267 See generally Id. (stating that some do not understand the Justice Department's
motivation).
268 See Putka,, supra note 159 (noting that overlap also raises issues of "Good
Practice").
269 See id. "Overlap is at least in violation of the letter of the principal, but perhaps
the colleges would argue not in violation of the spirit." Id. "Critics say the Ivy League and
other top colleges have laid the political groundwork for the federal investigators by
projecting an image of wealth and indifference to parental fears about affordability as
they raised tuitions in the 1980s at a pace well above historical rates." Putka,, supra note
159.
270 See Hoxby, supra note 40, at 24. Hoxby identifies another influence:
Nevertheless, we might worry about other events influencing colleges that
coincide with the timing of the antitrust action. The obvious candidate is the
performance of financial markets over the period under consideration.
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Intentional or by chance, accusing the Reagan-Bush
administrations of overzealous prosecutorial discretion was an
effective tactic. It shifted attention from the tedious and
complicated issue of student aid as price-fixing to the hot topic of
governmental interference. 273 The image of elite Ivy League
schools subjected to antitrust investigation smacked of a "witch
hunt" - which had the effect of deflecting attention from the real
issue 274 while encouraging rumors of a chilling effect on inter-
institutional relations. 275
CONCLUSION: A KERR-EMERSONIAN CONSTRUCT
The acceptance of the non-profit model as the definitive criteria
for public policy by the Third Circuit and Congress is the safe
haven for the 568 President's Group. The core assumption is
that profit maximization does not exist in the world of education
where a scattergraph of objectives is allocated among the
Fluctuations in financial markets produce corresponding fluctuations in
endowments, which are a major source of income for most private, highly
selective colleges. Following positive shocks to their endowments, colleges might
increase their total expenditure on financial aid and decrease the rate of increase
in tuition. It is possible that the continued pursuit (rather than the initiation) of
the antitrust action was endogenous to the performance of financial markets.
The fact colleges appeared to be rich in 1990 may have increased DOJ's appetite
for the investigation. Would DOJ have pursued the investigation just as strongly
in the early 1980s, when tuition was rising faster than it was in 1990 but the
financial markets made the colleges appear comparatively poor?
Id. at 25.
Some writers have suggested that there was a link between the antitrust investigation
and the federal investigation of Stanford University for misuse of federal research
grants. There was no logical or practical link between the cases, however. There were
not, for instance, data that were relevant to both investigations. If there was any link
at all, it was probably just that both investigations were partially spurred by the
colleges' apparent wealth. Id. at 25.
271 Fuller, supra note 1, at 34 (noting name of bar where the group would meet).
272 Putka, supra note 159. Putka quotes Joe Case who said, "Overlap was started...
to end a bidding war for good students among selective Eastern Colleges..." Id.
273 See Jaschik, supra note 33 (noting there has not been any public outcry about the
investigation).
274 See id. "I've heard of three examples of college people trying to pretend this is not
a real issue by getting it depicted as a witch-hunt. That is deeply self-centered on their
part; and so blend to the real issues." Id.
275 See id. "It has a chilling effect on very legitimate collegial relationships between
institutions .... Ms. Hanson said that, as colleges have tried to improve their budget
forecasts in recent years, they have consulted with other institutions to check their
projections of such factors as inflation, government support, and enrollment trends. These
sorts of things might not continue, she said, even though they help colleges make more
accurate budget projections so that they can limit tuition increases. College decisions will
also be affected, Ms. Hanson said, by the lawyers most institutions are hiring, who have
the interests of their clients in mind and not the larger interests of higher education." Id.
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preferences of students, faculty, donors, and parents. 276 Since
priorities constantly shift among preferences, there can never be
an objective and static statement on economic results. There is,
however, a competing "construct"277 which acknowledges a
softening between the assumed solid barriers between profit and
non-profit.
As Clark Kerr predicted, the Academy nurtured its own
constituency of stockholders in the production of the most
popular product in the civilized world - a college degree. Like
the profit sector, they sell a mixed package of economic and social
components - all designed to cultivate and propagate a
trademarked degree whose value is determined by a stock
market system known as "rankings".278 Institutional addiction to
brand competition and product differentiation functions as both
cause and effect: "The undue influence of outside consultants in
marketing colleges and students."279
Like a profit conglomerate firm schools allocate resources to
the subsidiary-affiliates on the basis of the best result -
sometimes social objectives, other times economic, with a revenue
motivation. Schools, like corporations, know that if they lose
some "stars" from, for example, the economics department, the
value of their product - the degree - will go down and the
rational reaction is a shift of resources in response.280 In the
conglomerate world, it is called cross-subsidization. 281 In higher
education, it could be creating a new revenue source by imposing
a high tax on a cash rich law school. 282
276 See U.S. v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 303 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (noting that
non-profit educational institutions have diverse interests).
277 See note 205 and accompanying text. The court in Brown explains that colleges
have both non-profit and profit goals. See Brown, 5 F.3d. at 672.
278 See Jeff Lustig, The Mixed Legacy of Clark Kerr: A Personal View, ACADEME,
Jul./Aug. 2004, at 51 (proposing college is for knowledge production and consumption).
279 Lloyd Thacker, Confronting the Commercialization of Admissions, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 25, 2005, at B26. Thacker also condems the "marketing of prestige,
popularity, comfort, status, and brand as important educational criteria. That has
contributed to the transformation of education into product and student consumer." Id.
280 See Timothy Aeppel, Economists Gain Star Power: Hot Demand Lifts Salaries, As
Elite Universities Seek Big Names, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2005, at A2 (positing top named
professors will help recruit the brightest students).
281 World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.int/english/tratop-e/serv
e/telecome/tell2_e.htm (defining cross-subsidization as "The practice of using profits
generated from one product or service to support another provided by the same operating
identity").
282 See Arthur S. Hayes, Law Schools Prove Milkable Cash Cows For Many
Struggling Parent Universities, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1992, at BI (commenting that law
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A Kerr-Emersonian construct is a metaphor for higher
education as revenue diversification, dedicated to success in
allocating resources among competing subsidiaries to maximize
market performance as measured by prestiage. Students,
faculty, research, and donors, are the dominant subsidiaries,
each proffering a balance sheet of costs, preferences, and
production statements to justify their role in achieving and
executing the school's objectives.
Students, as producers, are valued according to merit and/or a
socioeconomic index. Faculty salaries, carried on the books as a
cost, quantify the individual's contribution to market
performance; supracompetitive remuneration constitutes a
dividend, calculated on the basis of the professor's status on a
spectrum of average to star.283 Research is defined by recognition
within the Academy and success is motivated by higher wage
dividends, grants and awards. The donation stream is the result
of an effective symbiosis of the subsidiary units elevating the
prestiage factor into endowment. On Harvard's $19 billion
endowment (which increased to $25.9 billion by 2005)284 the
president of Bard College said: "We've reduced our definition of
worth into fame and wealth, and it carries over into the way
institutions think about themselves. An overwhelmingly huge
part of what Harvard is about is about managing its money."285
Whatever the context, the academic institution's revenue
stream incorporates the participation of stakeholders - higher
education's version of shareholder - whose performance can earn
a dividend. Like any shareholder they are motivated by a vested
interest in maximizing corporate success. Endowment portfolios
managers get hefty bonuses, 286 president's get compensation
school was a barely break even operation); Ken Myers, Professors at GWU Law Charges
That University Takes Too Much, NAT. L.J, May 2, 1994, at A14 (stating law school was
keeping school revenue).
283 See Kirp, supra note 225, at Chap. 4. Often identified as the subject of a lateral
acquisition. See id.
284 See Ben Gose, Prudent Management or Outright Greed? Critics Ask How Big
Endowments Should Be, THE CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, MAY 27, 2004, at 9 (reporting
that Harvard is seeking even more money than their nearly $20 billion in cash).
285 Johanna Berkman, Harvard's Hoard, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, June 24, 2001, at 38,
40 (noting Harvard is safe if there is an atomic bomb).
286 See David L. Marcus, The New College All-Stars, US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,
Nov. 13, 2000, at 49 (noting college billionaires' club is crowded); John L. Pulley,
Embracing Performance Pay, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 16, 2003, at A28 (noting
Klapp is a fund-raising success).
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packages commensurate with colleagues in commerce, while
everyone on campus has a shot at the ubiquitous amenity
dividend. 287 As consumers students are the recipients of upscale
lodging, food, and recreational facilities. It's "luxury learning"
with a capitalist twist. 28 8 And then there is a dividend that has
become a virtual entitlement - the x-inefficiencies that every
professor learns to inveigle - free meals and trips, faculty
discounts, summer grants, subsidized moonlighting as
consultants, public intellectuals on the Call Girl circuit 28 9 or
media "quote-suppliers" 290 - the list is endless.
In what he termed the Second Transformation, Clark Kerr
predicted an Intersection of university and industry in which
faculty, especially in the natural and social sciences, would
assume the "characteristics of an entrepreneur".291 He also
surmised that the key to growth and success was money.2 92
Kerr's perspicacity has been confirmed with recognition of a
bundling at elite academic institutions of education, industry,
and money. 293 In a Kuhnian paradigm shift the university as
287 See generally Julie L. Nicklin, 74 Private -College Presidents Earned More Than
3000,000 in 1998-9, THE CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., November 24, 2000, at A26 (explaining
The Chronicle began tracking executive compensation).
288 See Weinbach, supra note 232. "The universities blame the amenities arms race
on cutthroat competition for top applicants. But critics are asking the obvious question:
Shouldn't that money go towards labs and libraries instead of fitness centers and
smoothie bars? Even more important, some campus perks, especially the luxurious
dorms, cost significantly more money - potentially 'ghettoizing' college life for kids who
can't afford them. Indeed, some contend much of the upgrading is simply a business
proposition, an effort by academic institutions to boost their own fortunes by attracting
rich kids. 'We're allowing people's wallets, from the get-go, to determine what kind of life
they can enjoy on campus,' says Larry Rosenthal, an urban-housing specialist at the
University of California, Berkeley. It goes against 'principles of higher education'."
"[C]olleges from Northwestern to Duke are pushing free cell phones, free cable television,
and even specially baked birthday cakes." See also Bernstein, supra note 232; Rimes,
supra note 232.
289 See ARTHUR KOESTLER, THE CALL-GIRLS: A TRAGI-COMEDY 7 (1973). "It becomes
a habit, maybe an addiction. You get a long-distance telephone call from some
professional busybody at some foundation or university - "sincerely hope you can fit it
into your schedule - it will be privilege to have you with us - return fare economy-class
and a modest honorarium of- ..." Id.
290 See Herbert Gans, The Future of the Public Intellectual, THE NATION, Feb. 12,
2001, at 25. "Most public intellectuals function as quote-suppliers to legitimize the
media . You know, if no journalist calls for a quote, them I'm not a public intellectual; I
just sit there writing my books and teaching classes." Id.
291 See Kerr, supra note 51, at 90.
292 See id. at 117.
293 See Arenson, supra note 231. "There's been a paradigm shift [said a University of
Southern California vice-provost]. There was a time that this kind of work - and the idea
of making money from your research - was not acceptable at universities, including ours."
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entrepreneur relies on MBA management techniques to nurture
the money stream derived from sources such as outsourcing, 294
research and patent marketing, 295 and joint venturing with for-
profit enterprises. 296  The new Intersection willingly
accommodates an "education is a business" 2 97 ethos.
It is too soon to accept the new paradigm as sufficiently
formulated and tested to provide a basis for public policy.
Nevertheless, the widespread presence of a vigorous dialogue
suggests the first stage in Kuhn's description of paradigm change
- a "crisis" in which the assumptions of the dominant paradigm
cannot adequately respond to new "puzzles". 298 The crisis is here:
the commingling of profit and capitalism with education
threatening "anomalies whose characteristic feature is their
stubborn refusal to be assimilated to existing paradigms."299 The
anomaly's capstone is a conflict between the corrupting effects of
"corporatization" on the education mission and the benefits of the
money stream supporting the socioideological vision of the
institution.300 According to Kuhn, a crisis is resolved by
294 See id. "Our motivation is to be entrepreneurial...We've been giving it away for
generations. Now we want to get a fair return, always so we can reinvest it. That is
changing the relationship of universities to the outside world." Id.
295 See Goldie Blumenstyk, Colleges Seek a Record Number of Patents, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 3, 2004, at A27 (commenting that some of America's elite educational
institutions have been successful in patenting and licensing ventures); Goldie
Blumenstyk, Income From University Licenses on Patents Exceeded $1 Billion, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 22, 2002, at A22 (observing universities are filing patents on
inventions more aggressively).
296 See Audrey Williams June, Checking In on Campus: Colleges Become Hoteliers to
Pamper Visitors and Get More of Their Money, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 16, 2002, at
A29 (reporting Saint Louis University has entered into ventures with hotels and hospitals
in order to bolster university-related business).
297 See Bernard Wysocki, How Dr. Papadakis Runs a University Like a Company,
Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 2005, at 1-A, 13A (noting many universities are grappling with how
"business-minded" they should be. There is also debate as to what the compensation
packages of their money managers should be comprised of).
298 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 92 (1970) ("In
both political and scientific development the sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is
prerequisite to revolution").
299 See id. at 97 ("Paradigms provide all phenomena except anomalies with a theory-
determined place in the scientist's field of vision").
300 Commentary on the crisis on higher education flourishes. See generally, supra
note 41, Kerr, supra note 51, Kabaservice, supra note 92, Menand, supra note 103, Kirp,
supra note 225, Giroux, supra note 226, Bok, supra note 228, see Eric Gould, The
University in a Corporate Culture (2003); Christopher Newfield , Ivy and Industry:
Business and the Making of the American University,1880-1980 (2003); Richard Ohmann,
Politics and Knowledge: The Commercialization of the University, the Professions, and
Print Culture (Press, 2003); Jennifer Washburn, University Inc.: The Corporate
Corruption of Higher Education (2005); James 0. Freedman, Liberal Education and the
Public Interest (2005).
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"revolution", a face-off between models in which "[c]onversion will
occur a few at a time until, after the last handouts have died, the
whole profession will again be practicing under a single, but now
different, paradigm".301
This will not be a quick or cordial paradigm shift. Too many
people with strong commitments - the education lobby, social
scientists already attached to existing models, corporatizers 302 -
and perhaps trust-busters still holding a grudge against the
Prestige Cartel. Any consensus from the inevitable contention
will have to accommodate the static from the growing separation
between the "elite" institutions and the "other" schools. The
Prestige Cartel is composed of mostly private schools, heavily
endowed, research intense, star faculty and merit students,
blending into a source of market power. They shrewdly play the
ranking game to cultivate media interest.303 Elite institutions
favor a trust or holding company organizational scheme
composed of virtually autonomous fiefdoms in a mixture of non-
profit and profit activities. 304 Collectively the Prestige Cartel
shares a form of monopoly power, confronting putative rivals
with what Judge Hand called "the advantage of experience, trade
connection, the elite of personal."305 Hence "one might fancy that
the Overlaps had cornered the Prestige market ... ."306
The Others are mostly public institutions whose traditional
source of positive cross-elasticity of demand with the Prestige
Cartel came from taxpayer subsidy. While generous funding,
strong alumni support, and effective management enabled a
small group of universities to compete with the elites, an
epidemic of budget anemia - "unfunding" - has driven schools to
301 See Kuhn, supra note 298, at 152.
302 See Basinger, supra note 251. "College presidents should support and encourage
collaborations between university researchers and private corporations, according to a
report issued last week by the American Council on Education and the National Alliance
of Business .... The report urges universities to adopt hiring, tenure, and promotion
policies that reward researchers for collaborating with industries. Universities also
should coordinate the various offices that support such collaborations, and consider
creating central offices to oversee the partnerships, the report says." Id.
303 See Thacker, supra note 279 ("Excessive media interest in a group of elite
institutions that both responds to increased consumer interest in "the best colleges" and
encourages the frenzy").
304 See id. (advancing that colleges, often held in public trust, have the "obligation
and the power" to shape the educational system in America).
305 U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148.F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
306 See O'Brien, supra note 41, at 146.
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embrace privatization. 307 A president of the University of
Michigan described his school as a "privately funded public
university."308 This is an issue that fuels more static for the
paradigm crisis by forcing the "self-sufficiency" option into the
mix. 309 The University of Virginia countered defunding by
negotiating a franchise relationship for law and graduate
business schools with the central administration enabling them
to operate under a private budget subsidized by corporate
revenues, executive educational programs, and even profits from
a school owned hotel. "In its eagerness to enter the elite national
ranks, Darden (U.Va's Business School) has made the pursuit of
money its main objective." 310 Anticipating the future the Virginia
Legislature is considering "state-assisted charter" university
status for U.Va., William and Mary, and Virginia Tech, providing
budgeting flexibility. 311
The antitrust Exemption expires in 2008.312 So long as the
Elites continue to integrate the non-profit mission with the
lessons of capitalism renewal is a long shot. The Exemption's
sunset will invite Antitrust scrutiny and a hard look at an
industry that exhibits the mutual interdependence
characteristics of an oligopoly - including the persistent increase
in prices. It is the profile of an industry ripe for a wave of Civil
Investigative inquiries.
Trustbusters will return to the education industry with the
knowledge that the credibility of the Third Circuit's approval of a
social consciousness defense is now of problematical credibility.
307 See Sam Dillon, At Private Universities, Warnings of Privatization, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 2005, at 112 (warning while privatization is going on at many flagship
universities, it is clear that most academic institutions of higher learning cannot surivive
without the aid of public funding).
308 See id. (noting Michigan finances approximately 18 percent of the University of
Michigan at Ann Arbor's revenue).
309 See id. (concluding as a result of the paradigm crisis, most public universities are
looking more and more like private institutions).
310 Kirp, supra note 225, at 144 (advancing the theory that, by focusing on making
money, Virginia has decreased its emphasis on faculty research).
311 See Sara Hebel, A Businessman Bridges the Political Aisle, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Feb. 25, 2005, at Al, A21 (reporting Governor Warner was dubious about how
much money the schools would actually save by winning the aid of government
assistance).
312 See Stephen Burd, Congress May Permit Aid Talks to Continue, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Nov. 2, 2001, at A31 (reporting the group has met every year to determine how
much financial aid would be given to students who were admitted to multiple "elite"
institutions).
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Even assuming a "pure" Emersonian model, a social welfare
justification is not a process efficient option for the judicial
process - judgments on topics like educational policy are too
ambiguous and contentious. The effort to accommodate diversity
as a function of competition for example. 313 More importantly,
events have rendered social welfare a moot issue. So long as
revenue is the reigning factor in the Elite's management ethos,
courts will be obliged to respond to antitrust claims in a
complementary fashion by exclusive reliance on economic
criteria. 314
313 See Andrew Delbanco, The Endangered University, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar.24,
2005, at 19 ("Yet it is risky to raise any question - even a friendly one about the
educational consequences of diversity").
314 See Andrew Hacker, The Truth About the Colleges, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 3,
2005, at 51, 52 ("The colleges' costs are also relevant here. The twelve have similar price
tags despite differences in endowments and local labor costs. Even if there isn't overt
consultation, there seems to be a kind of consensus not to engage in price competition").
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